Secure Account Recovery for a Privacy-Preserving Web Service
Ryan Little, Lucy Qin, Mayank Varia
摘要
If a web service is so secure that it does not even knowand does not want to know-the identity and contact info of its users, can it still offer account recovery if a user forgets their password? This paper is the culmination of the authors' work to design a cryptographic protocol for account recovery for use by a prominent secure matching system: a web-based service that allows survivors of sexual misconduct to become aware of other survivors harmed by the same perpetrator. In such a system, the list of account-holders must be safeguarded, even against the service provider itself. In this work, we design an account recovery system that, on the surface, appears to follow the typical workflow: the user types in their email address, receives an email containing a one-time link, and answers some security questions. Behind the scenes, the defining feature of our recovery system is that the service provider can perform email-based account validation without knowing, or being able to learn, a list of users' email addresses. Our construction uses standardized cryptography for most components, and it has been deployed in production at the secure matching system. As a building block toward our main construction, we design a new cryptographic primitive that may be of independent interest: an oblivious pseudorandom function that can either have a fully-private input or a partially-public input, and that reaches the same output either way. This primitive allows us to perform online rate limiting for account recovery attempts, without imposing a bound on the creation of new accounts. We provide an open-source implementation of this primitive and provide evaluation results showing that the end-to-end interaction time takes 8.4-60.4 ms in fully-private input mode and 3.1-41.2 ms in partially-public input mode. Content Warning: This paper discusses, at a high level, the issue of sexual assault on college campuses, particularly in Section 1. From Section 3 onward, the paper is more focused on the technical design of the account recovery protocol.
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