FedRecover: Recovering from Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning using Historical Information
Xiaoyu Cao, Jinyuan Jia, Zaixi Zhang, Neil Zhenqiang Gong
摘要
Federated learning is vulnerable to poisoning attacks in which malicious clients poison the global model via sending malicious model updates to the server. Existing defenses focus on preventing a small number of malicious clients from poisoning the global model via robust federated learning methods and detecting malicious clients when there are a large number of them. However, it is still an open challenge how to recover the global model from poisoning attacks after the malicious clients are detected. A naive solution is to remove the detected malicious clients and train a new global model from scratch using the remaining clients. However, such train-from-scratch recovery method incurs a large computation and communication cost, which may be intolerable for resource-constrained clients such as smartphones and IoT devices.In this work, we propose FedRecover, a method that can recover an accurate global model from poisoning attacks with a small computation and communication cost for the clients. Our key idea is that the server estimates the clients’ model updates instead of asking the clients to compute and communicate them during the recovery process. In particular, the server stores the historical information, including the global models and clients’ model updates in each round, when training the poisoned global model before the malicious clients are detected. During the recovery process, the server estimates a client’s model update in each round using its stored historical information. Moreover, we further optimize FedRecover to recover a more accurate global model using warm-up, periodic correction, abnormality fixing, and final tuning strategies, in which the server asks the clients to compute and communicate their exact model updates. Theoretically, we show that the global model recovered by FedRecover is close to or the same as that recovered by train-from-scratch under some assumptions. Empirically, our evaluation on four datasets, three federated learning methods, as well as untargeted and targeted poisoning attacks (e.g., backdoor attacks) shows that FedRecover is both accurate and efficient.
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引用它的顶会 Paper16
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它引用的顶会 Paper11
- Neural Cleanse: Identifying and Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in Neural NetworksBolun Wang, Yuanshun Yao, Shawn Shan, Huiying Li 等S&P 2019 · 被引用 1,801 次
- Machine UnlearningLucas Bourtoule, Varun Chandrasekaran, Christopher A. Choquette-Choo, Hengrui Jia 等S&P 2021 · 被引用 1,381 次
- FLDetector: Defending Federated Learning Against Model Poisoning Attacks via Detecting Malicious ClientsZaixi Zhang, Xiaoyu Cao, Jinyuan Jia, Neil Zhenqiang GongKDD 2022 · 被引用 293 次
- DeltaGrad: Rapid retraining of machine learning modelsYinjun Wu, Edgar Dobriban, Susan B. DavidsonICML 2020 · 被引用 262 次
- Provably Secure Federated Learning against Malicious ClientsXiaoyu Cao, Jinyuan Jia, Neil Zhenqiang GongAAAI 2021 · 被引用 161 次
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