CETIS: Retrofitting Intel CET for Generic and Efficient Intra-process Memory Isolation
Mengyao Xie, Chenggang Wu, Yinqian Zhang, Jiali Xu, Yuanming Lai, Yan Kang, Wei Wang, Zhe Wang
摘要
Intel control-flow enforcement technology (CET) is a new hardware feature available in recent Intel processors. It supports the coarse-grained control-flow integrity for software to defeat memory corruption attacks. In this paper, we retrofit CET, particularly the write-protected shadow pages of CET used for implementing shadow stacks, to develop a generic and efficient intra-process memory isolation mechanism, dubbed CETIS. To provide user-friendly interfaces, a CETIS framework was developed, which provides memory file abstraction for the isolated memory regions and a set of APIs to access said regions. CETIS also comes with a compiler-assisted tool chain for users to build secure applications easily. The practicality of using CETIS to protect CPI, CFIXX, and JIT-compilers was demonstrated, and the evaluation reveals that CETIS is performed better than state-of-the-art intramemory isolation mechanisms, such as MPK. CCS CONCEPTS • Security and privacy → Software and application security.
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引用它的顶会 Paper11
- PANIC: PAN-assisted Intra-process Memory Isolation on ARMJiali Xu, Mengyao Xie, Chenggang Wu, Yinqian Zhang 等CCS 2023 · 被引用 11 次
- Endokernel: A Thread Safe Monitor for Lightweight Subprocess IsolationFangfei Yang, Bumjin Im, Weijie Huang, Kelly Kaoudis 等USENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 8 次
- Extending Applications Safely and EfficientlyYusheng Zheng, Tong Yu, Yiwei Yang, Yanpeng Hu 等OSDI 2025 · 被引用 7 次
- PeTAL: Ensuring Access Control Integrity against Data-only Attacks on LinuxJuhee Kim, Jinbum Park, Yoochan Lee, Chengyu Song 等CCS 2024 · 被引用 6 次
- Erebor: A Drop-In Sandbox Solution for Private Data Processing in Untrusted Confidential Virtual MachinesChuqi Zhang, Rahul Priolkar, Yuancheng Jiang, Yuan Xiao 等EuroSys 2025 · 被引用 4 次
它引用的顶会 Paper17
- Data-Oriented Programming: On the Expressiveness of Non-control Data AttacksHong Hu, Shweta Shinde, Sendroiu Adrian, Zheng Leong Chua 等S&P 2016 · 被引用 420 次
- ERIM: Secure, Efficient In-process Isolation with Protection Keys (MPK)Anjo Vahldiek-Oberwagner, Eslam Elnikety, Nuno O. Duarte, Michael Sammler 等USENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 247 次
- SoK: Shining Light on Shadow StacksNathan Burow, Xinping Zhang, Mathias PayerS&P 2019 · 被引用 170 次
- HDFI: Hardware-Assisted Data-Flow IsolationChengyu Song, Hyungon Moon, Monjur Alam, Insu Yun 等S&P 2016 · 被引用 146 次
- Block Oriented Programming: Automating Data-Only AttacksKyriakos K. Ispoglou, Bader AlBassam, Trent Jaeger, Mathias PayerCCS 2018 · 被引用 143 次
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