Greedily Maximizing Ex-Ante Fairness

We study a general framework of optimization with the aim to compute fair solutions in settings with a set of agents whose valuations are combined using an aggregation function. The strength of our framework lies (1) in its generality and (2) in the fact that we leverage the power of ex-ante fairness, a concept that has recently gained much attention in the scope of fair allocation and fairness in AI in general. More precisely, in our setting there are n set functions f1, . . . , fn (e.g., the valuation functions of n agents) that are combined using an aggregation function g (e.g., the minimum, Nash social welfare, p-norm). The power of ex-ante fairness is obtained by allowing as a feasible solution not simply a finite set S, but instead a distribution Π over feasible sets. The goal in our setting is then to find a probability distribution p ∈ Π that maximizes the value resulting from aggregating (using g) the n expected values of the functions f1, . . . , fn obtained when sampling a set S according to the distribution p. We stress that this is different from maximizing the expected value of g (ex-post fairness) and typically allows for much fairer solutions. We give three different greedy algorithms for three different settings of this framework and prove that they achieve constant approximation guarantees under certain realistic assumptions. For some of the settings, we show that these approximation guarantees are tight. Specific scenarios that can be modelled using our framework include fair information diffusion in social networks, fair submodular matching problems and exante versions of item assignment problems.