FLEXDROID: Enforcing In-App Privilege Separation in Android
Jaebaek Seo, Daehyeok Kim, Donghyun Cho, Insik Shin, Taesoo Kim
摘要
Mobile applications are increasingly integrating third-party libraries to provide various features, such as advertising, analytics, social networking, and more. Unfortunately, such integration with third-party libraries comes with the cost of potential privacy violations of users, because Android always grants a full set of permissions to third-party libraries as their host applications. Unintended accesses to users' private data are underestimated threats to users' privacy, as complex and often obfuscated third-party libraries make it hard for application developers to estimate the correct behaviors of thirdparty libraries. More critically, a wide adoption of native code (JNI) and dynamic code executions such as Java reflection or dynamic code reloading, makes it even harder to apply state-ofthe-art security analysis. In this work, we propose FLEXDROID, a new Android security model and isolation mechanism, that provides dynamic, fine-grained access control for third-party libraries. With FLEXDROID, application developers not only can gain a full control of third-party libraries (e.g., which permissions to grant or not), but also can specify how to make them behave after detecting a privacy violation (e.g., providing a mock user's information or kill). To achieve such goals, we define a new notion of principals for third-party libraries, and develop a novel security mechanism, called inter-process stack inspection that is effective to JNI as well as dynamic code execution. Our usability study shows that developers can easily adopt FLEXDROID's policy to their existing applications. Finally, our evaluation shows that FLEXDROID can effectively restrict the permissions of third-party libraries with negligible overheads. Permission to freely reproduce all or part of this paper for noncommercial purposes is granted provided that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Reproduction for commercial purposes is strictly prohibited without the prior written consent of the Internet Society, the first-named author (for reproduction of an entire paper only), and the author's employer if the paper was prepared within the scope of employment.
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