Snowflake, a censorship circumvention system using temporary WebRTC proxies
Cecylia Bocovich, Arlo Breault, David Fifield, Serene, Xiaokang Wang
摘要
Snowflake is a system for circumventing Internet censorship. Its blocking resistance comes from the use of numerous, ultralight, temporary proxies ("snowflakes"), which accept traffic from censored clients using peer-to-peer WebRTC protocols and forward it to a centralized bridge. The temporary proxies are simple enough to be implemented in JavaScript, in a web page or browser extension, making them much cheaper to run than a traditional proxy or VPN server. The large and constantly changing pool of proxy addresses resists enumeration and blocking by a censor. The system is built on the assumption that proxies may appear or disappear at any time: clients discover live proxies dynamically using a secure rendezvous protocol; when an in-use proxy goes offline, its client switches to another on the fly, invisibly to upper network layers. Snowflake has been deployed with success in Tor Browser and Orbot for several years. It has been a significant circumvention tool during high-profile network disruptions, including in Russia in 2021 and Iran in 2022. In this paper, we explain the composition of Snowflake's many parts, give a history of deployment and blocking attempts, and reflect on implications for circumvention generally.
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引用它的顶会 Paper5
- SpotProxy: Rediscovering the Cloud for Censorship CircumventionPatrick Tser Jern Kon, Sina Kamali, Jinyu Pei, Diogo Barradas 等USENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 7 次
- Mirage: Private, Mobility-based Routing for Censorship EvasionZachary Ratliff, RuoxingYang, Avery Bai, Harel Berger 等NDSS 2026 · 被引用 1 次
- Huma: Censorship Circumvention via Web Protocol Tunneling with Deferred Traffic ReplacementSina Kamali, Diogo BarradasNDSS 2026 · 被引用 1 次
- Evaluating Practical Enumeration and Blocking Attacks on the Snowflake Circumvention SystemLinden Chen, Ryan Sangha, Cecylia Bocovich, Ram Sundara RamanCCS 2026
- CircumVolve: Automated Discovery of Censorship Evasion Strategies Using Large Language ModelsAli Zohaib, Jackson Sippe, Jade Sheffey, Mingshi Wu 等CCS 2026
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- The use of TLS in Censorship CircumventionSergey Frolov, Eric WustrowNDSS 2019 · 被引用 97 次
- SoK: Towards Grounding Censorship Circumvention in EmpiricismMichael Carl Tschantz, Sadia Afroz, anonymous, Vern PaxsonS&P 2016 · 被引用 89 次
- Censored Planet: An Internet-wide, Longitudinal Censorship ObservatoryRam Sundara Raman, Prerana Shenoy, Katharina Kohls, Roya EnsafiCCS 2020 · 被引用 68 次
- Conjure: Summoning Proxies from Unused Address SpaceSergey Frolov, Jack Wampler, Sze Chuen Tan, J. Alex Halderman 等CCS 2019 · 被引用 28 次
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