Once is Never Enough: Foundations for Sound Statistical Inference in Tor Network Experimentation
Rob Jansen, Justin Tracey, Ian Goldberg
摘要
Tor is a popular low-latency anonymous communication system that focuses on usability and performance: a faster network will attract more users, which in turn will improve the anonymity of everyone using the system. The standard practice for previous research attempting to enhance Tor performance is to draw conclusions from the observed results of a single simulation for standard Tor and for each research variant. But because the simulations are run in sampled Tor networks, it is possible that sampling error alone could cause the observed effects. Therefore, we call into question the practical meaning of any conclusions that are drawn without considering the statistical significance of the reported results. In this paper, we build foundations upon which we improve the Tor experimental method. First, we present a new Tor network modeling methodology that produces more representative Tor networks as well as new and improved experimentation tools that run Tor simulations faster and at a larger scale than was previously possible. We showcase these contributions by running simulations with 6,489 relays and 792k simultaneously active users, the largest known Tor network simulations and the first at a network scale of 100%. Second, we present new statistical methodologies through which we: (i) show that running multiple simulations in independently sampled networks is necessary in order to produce informative results; and (ii) show how to use the results from multiple simulations to conduct sound statistical inference. We present a case study using 420 simulations to demonstrate how to apply our methodologies to a concrete set of Tor experiments and how to analyze the results.
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引用它的顶会 Paper6
- Co-opting Linux Processes for High-Performance Network SimulationRob Jansen, James Newsome, Ryan WailsUSENIX ATC 2022 · 被引用 34 次
- CELLSHIFT: RTT-Aware Trace Transduction for Real-World Website FingerprintingRob JansenNDSS 2026 · 被引用 5 次
- ProbFlow : Using Probabilistic Programming in Anonymous Communication NetworksHussein Darir, Geir E. Dullerud, Nikita BorisovNDSS 2023
- Evaluating Practical Enumeration and Blocking Attacks on the Snowflake Circumvention SystemLinden Chen, Ryan Sangha, Cecylia Bocovich, Ram Sundara RamanCCS 2026
- Censorship Evasion with Unidentified Protocol GenerationRyan Wails, Rob Jansen, Aaron Johnson, Micah SherrUSENIX Security 2025
它引用的顶会 Paper8
- Safely Measuring TorRob Jansen, Aaron JohnsonCCS 2016 · 被引用 76 次
- Point Break: A Study of Bandwidth Denial-of-Service Attacks against TorRob Jansen, Tavish Vaidya, Micah SherrUSENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 49 次
- Avoiding The Man on the Wire: Improving Tor's Security with Trust-Aware Path SelectionAaron Johnson, Rob Jansen, Aaron D. Jaggard, Joan Feigenbaum 等NDSS 2017 · 被引用 30 次
- Distributed Measurement with Private Set-Union CardinalityEllis Fenske, Akshaya Mani, Aaron Johnson, Micah SherrCCS 2017 · 被引用 27 次
- Privacy-Preserving Dynamic Learning of Tor Network TrafficRob Jansen, Matthew Traudt, Nicholas HopperCCS 2018 · 被引用 26 次
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