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NSDI2026顶会

Secure Vickrey Auctions for Online Advertising

Archit Bhatnagar, Yunming Xiao, Ang Chen, Amrita Roy Chowdhury

出版方
2026年份
1被引次数

摘要

Online advertising is an essential part of the web ecosystem. When a user's browser lands on a webpage, advertisers bid for the ad space. An auction algorithm (e.g., Vickrey/second-price auction) is executed to determine the winner and the price; ideally, only this information is revealed, and everything else (i.e., the losing bids and the bidder identities) is kept private. However, achieving these privacy goals under a malicious security model, while operating under stringent performance requirements for online advertising, is challenging.

Obsidian enables secure Vickrey auctions for online advertising with three ideas: a new Multiparty Computation (MPC)friendly encoding scheme that decouples bid values from bidders' identities; a novel use of function secret sharing to shift the cost of encoding validation to an offline phase; and a lightweight ring signature scheme to anonymously verify bidders. Obsidian outperforms generic MPC and homomorphic encryption approaches by orders of magnitude. Moreover, it also surpasses the state-of-the-art system, Addax, which is tailored to ad auctions under a weaker (covert) threat model and leaks more information.

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