A Full Threshold NIST PQC-Compliant Framework for Distributed Trust in Federal Public Key Infrastructure
Kiarash Sedghighadikolaei, Changqi Sun, Thang Hoang, Bechir Hamdaoui, Attila A. Yavuz
摘要
The U.S. Federal Public Key Infrastructures (FPKI) relies on digital certificates and a network of Certificate Authorities (CAs) to build trust between federal agencies and their commercial partners. However, the current certificate generation process of FPKI faces two critical issues: The emerging quantum threats that jeopardize the security of conventionalsecure digital signatures and the systemic vulnerabilities introduced by centralized signing operations. While threshold Post-Quantum (PQ) signatures offer a promising foundation for compromise-resilient trust, their adoption within the FPKI remains constrained by strict standard compliance requirements. ML-DSA is a prominent construction for thresholding within the NIST-PQ standards. However, existing threshold constructions of ML-DSA diverge from the NIST standard, limiting algorithmic compliance and hindering adoption in regulated settings such as FPKI, which require thorough cryptanalysis and revalidation. Hence, no fully standard-compliant threshold PQ solution currently meets FPKI's need for a distributed and quantum-resistant trust infrastructure.
We introduce SHIELD, an efficient threshold NIST-PQcompliant signature framework that replaces its classical centralized counterpart in certificate generation within the FPKI. SHIELD provides several key properties that overcome the limitations of prior approaches. First, it achieves algorithmic FIPS-204 compliance and seamless functional interchangeability with standard ML-DSA, without altering the signing algorithm. Second, it conforms to FPKI's structural and operational requirements, provides high security against adversarial environments, and prevents fraudulent certificates by mitigating single-key compromise risks. Finally, we provide the opensource implementation of SHIELD. We empirically evaluated the performance of SHIELD under diverse network latency conditions to validate its practical conformance with FPKI operational needs. https://github.com/open-threshold-pqc/SHIELD.git • Compromise Resilience Against Arbitrary Malicious Corruptions. SHIELD provides quantum-UC-secure [56]
TABLE 1: Comparison of prior threshold ML-DSA vs. SHIELD's threshold ML-DSA for adoption in FPKI Work Algorithmic FIPS-204 Compliance Free of Security Revalidation Federal Interoperability Base Work Threshold Tools Concealing Rejected Signature Open Source Code ( ) Supported Parties ( )
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
它引用的顶会 Paper11
- Global-Scale Secure Multiparty ComputationXiao Wang, Samuel Ranellucci, Jonathan KatzCCS 2017 · 被引用 220 次
- Threshold Raccoon: Practical Threshold Signatures from Standard Lattice AssumptionsRafaël Del Pino, Shuichi Katsumata, Mary Maller, Fabrice Mouhartem 等EUROCRYPT 2024 · 被引用 61 次
- Adaptively Secure 5 Round Threshold Signatures from MLWE/MSIS and DL with RewindingShuichi Katsumata, Michael Reichle, Kaoru TakemureCRYPTO 2024 · 被引用 34 次
- SPRINT: High-Throughput Robust Distributed Schnorr SignaturesFabrice Benhamouda, Shai Halevi, Hugo Krawczyk, Yiping Ma 等EUROCRYPT 2024 · 被引用 25 次
- Glacius: Threshold Schnorr Signatures from DDH with Full Adaptive SecurityRenas Bacho, Sourav Das, Julian Loss, Ling RenEUROCRYPT 2025 · 被引用 21 次
相关 Paper
- Quorus: Efficient, Scalable Threshold ML-DSA Signatures from MPCAlexander Bienstock, Leo de Castro, Daniel Escudero, Antigoni Polychroniadou 等USENIX Security 2026 · 被引用 1 次
- Post-Quantum Authentication in TLS 1.3: A Performance StudyDimitrios Sikeridis, Panos Kampanakis, Michael DevetsikiotisNDSS 2020
- Efficient Threshold ML-DSASofía Celi, Rafael del Pino, Thomas Espitau, Guilhem Niot 等USENIX Security 2026 · 被引用 1 次
- Thresholdizing Standardized FALCON SignaturesRadhika Garg, Daniel Escudero, Antigoni Polychroniadou, Akira Takahashi 等CCS 2026
- A Tale of Two Worlds, a Formal Story of WireGuard HybridizationPascal Lafourcade, Dhekra Mahmoud, Sylvain Ruhault, Abdul Rahman TalebUSENIX Security 2025
