SEPAL: Towards a Large-scale Analysis of SEAndroid Policy Customization
Dongsong Yu, Guangliang Yang, Guozhu Meng, Xiaorui Gong, Xiu Zhang, Xiaobo Xiang, Xiaoyu Wang, Yue Jiang, Kai Chen, Wei Zou, Wenke Lee, Wenchang Shi
摘要
Nowadays, SEAndroid has been widely deployed in Android devices to enforce security policies and provide flexible mandatory access control (MAC), for the purpose of narrowing down attack surfaces and restricting risky operations. Generally, the original SEAndroid security policy rules are carefully and strictly written and maintained by the Android community. However, in practice, mobile device manufacturers usually have to customize these policy rules and add their own new rules to satisfy their functionality extensions, which breaks the integrity of SEAndroid and causes serious security issues. Still, up to now, it is a challenging task to identify these security issues due to the large and ever-increasing number of policy rules, as well as the complexity of policy semantics. To investigate the status quo of SEAndroid policy customization, we propose SEPAL, a universal tool to automatically retrieve and examine the customized policy rules. SEPAL applies the NLP technique and employs and trains a wide&deep model to quickly and precisely predict whether one rule is unregulated or not. Our evaluation shows SEPAL is effective, practical and scalable. We verify SEPAL outperforms the state of the art approach (i.e., EASE-Android) by 15% accuracy rate on average. In our experiments, SEPAL successfully identifies 7,111 unregulated policy rules with a low false positive rate from 595,236 customized rules (extracted from 774 Android firmware images of 72 manufacturers). We further discover the policy customization problem is getting worse in newer Android versions (e.g., around 8% for Android 7 and nearly 20% for Android 9), even though more and more efforts are made. Then, we conduct a deep study and discuss why the unregulated rules are introduced and how they can compromise user devices. Last, we report some unregulated rules to seven vendors and so far four of them confirm our findings.
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引用它的顶会 Paper4
- CASPR: Context-Aware Security Policy RecommendationLifang Xiao, Hanyu Wang, Aimin Yu, Lixin Zhao 等NDSS 2025
- A Longitudinal Analysis Of Replicas in the Wild Wild AndroidSyeda Mashal Abbas Zaidi, Shahpar Khan, Parjanya Vyas, Yousra AaferASE 2024
- Differential Verification of Information Flow in SEAndroid PoliciesLorenzo Ceragioli, Letterio Galletta, Edoardo LunatiFM 2026
- Virtual Reality, Real Problems: A Longitudinal Security Analysis of VR FirmwareVamsi Shankar Simhadri, Yichang Xiong, Habiba Farrukh, Xiaokuan ZhangCCS 2025
它引用的顶会 Paper3
- No Pardon for the Interruption: New Inference Attacks on Android Through Interrupt Timing AnalysisWenrui Diao, Xiangyu Liu, Zhou Li, Kehuan ZhangS&P 2016 · 被引用 79 次
- The Misuse of Android Unix Domain Sockets and Security ImplicationsYuru Shao, Jason Ott, Yunhan Jack Jia, Zhiyun Qian 等CCS 2016 · 被引用 41 次
- BigMAC: Fine-Grained Policy Analysis of Android FirmwareGrant Hernandez, Dave (Jing) Tian, Anurag Swarnim Yadav, Byron J. Williams 等USENIX Security 2020
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