Diffie-Hellman Picture Show: Key Exchange Stories from Commercial VoWiFi Deployments
Gabriel Karl Gegenhuber, Florian Holzbauer, Philipp É. Frenzel, Edgar R. Weippl, Adrian Dabrowski
摘要
Voice over Wi-Fi (VoWiFi) uses a series of IPsec tunnels to deliver IP-based telephony from the subscriber's phone (User Equipment, UE) into the Mobile Network Operator's (MNO) core network via an Internet-facing endpoint, the Evolved Packet Data Gateway (ePDG). IPsec tunnels are set up in phases. The first phase negotiates the cryptographic algorithm and parameters and performs a key exchange via the Internet Key Exchange protocol, while the second phase (protected by the above-established encryption) performs the authentication. An insecure key exchange would jeopardize the later stages and the data's security and confidentiality. In this paper, we analyze the phase 1 settings and implementations as they are found in phones as well as in commercially deployed networks worldwide. On the UE side, we identified a recent 5G baseband chipset from a major manufacturer that allows for fallback to weak, unannounced modes and verified it experimentally. On the MNO side -- among others -- we identified 13 operators (totaling an estimated 140 million subscribers) on three continents that all use the same globally static set of ten private keys, serving them at random. Those not-so-private keys allow the decryption of the shared keys of every VoWiFi user of all those operators. All these operators deployed their core network from one common manufacturer.
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