Narcissus: A Practical Clean-Label Backdoor Attack with Limited Information
Yi Zeng, Minzhou Pan, Hoang Anh Just, Lingjuan Lyu, Meikang Qiu, Ruoxi Jia
摘要
Backdoor attacks inject maliciously constructed data into a training set so that, at test time, the trained model misclassifies inputs patched with a backdoor trigger as an adversarially-desired target class. For backdoor attacks to bypass human inspection, it is essential that the injected data appear to be correctly labeled. The attacks with such property are often referred to as "clean-label attacks." The effectiveness of existing clean-label backdoor attacks crucially relies on the knowledge about the entire training set. However, in practice, it is costly or even impossible to obtain such knowledge as the training data are often gathered from multiple independent sources (e.g., face images from different users). It remains a question whether backdoor attacks still present a real threat. In this paper, we provide an affirmative answer to this question by designing an algorithm to mount clean-label backdoor attacks based only on the knowledge of representative examples from the target class. By inserting maliciously-crafted examples totaling just 0.5% of the target-class data size and 0.05% of the training set size, we can manipulate a model trained on this poisoned dataset to classify test examples from arbitrary classes into the target class when the examples are patched with a backdoor trigger; at the same time, the trained model still maintains good accuracy on typical test examples without the trigger as if it were trained on a clean dataset. Our attack is highly effective across datasets and models, and even when the trigger is injected into the physical world. We explore the space of defenses and find that, surprisingly, our attack can evade the latest state-of-the-art defenses in their vanilla form, or after a simple twist, we can adapt to the downstream defenses. We study the cause of the intriguing effectiveness and find that because the trigger synthesized by our attack contains features as persistent as the original semantic features of the target class, any attempt to remove such triggers would inevitably hurt the model accuracy first.
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