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CCS2023顶会

HODOR: Shrinking Attack Surface on Node.js via System Call Limitation

Wenya Wang, Xingwei Lin, Jingyi Wang, Wang Gao, Dawu Gu, Wei Lv, Jiashui Wang

2023年份
3被引次数
3顶会引用

摘要

Node.js applications are becoming more and more widely adopted in the server side, partly due to the convenience of building these applications on top of the runtime provided by popular Node.js engines and the large number of third-party packages provided by the Node Package Management (npm) registry. Node.js provides Node.js applications with system interaction capabilities using system calls. However, such convenience comes with a price, i.e., the attack surface of JavaScript arbitrary code execution (ACE) vulnerabilities is expanded to the system call level. There lies a noticeable gap between existing protection techniques in the JavaScript code level (either by code debloating or read-writeexecute permission restriction) and a targeted defense for emerging critical system call level exploitation. To fill the gap, we design and implement HODOR 1 , a lightweight runtime protection system based on enforcing precise system call restrictions when running a Node.js application. HODOR achieved this by addressing several nontrivial technical challenges. First, HODOR requires to construct highquality call graphs for both the Node.js application (in JavaScript) and its underlying Node.js framework (in JavaScript and C/C++). Specifically, HODOR incorporates several important optimizations in both the JavaScript and C/C++ level to improve the state-of-the-art tools for building more precise call graphs. Then, HODOR creates the main-thread whitelist and the thread-pool whitelist respectively containing the identified necessary system calls based on the call graphs mappings. Finally, with the whitelists, HODOR implements lightweight system call restriction using the Linux kernel feature Secure Computing Mode (seccomp) to shrink the attack surface. We utilize HODOR to protect 168 real-world Node.js applications compromised by arbitrary code/command execution attacks. HODOR could reduce the attack surface to 19.42% on average with negligible runtime overhead (i.e., <3%).

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