Syndrome Decoding in the Head: Shorter Signatures from Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Thibauld Feneuil, Antoine Joux, Matthieu Rivain
摘要
. Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge are useful tools to design signature schemes. The on-going effort to build a quantum computer urges the cryptography community to develop new secure cryptographic protocols based on quantum-hard cryptographic problems. One of the few directions is code-based cryptography for which the strongest problem is the syndrome decoding (SD) for random linear codes. This problem is known to be NP -hard and the cryptanalysis state of the art has been stable for many years. A zero-knowledge protocol for this problem was pioneered by Stern in 1993. Since its publication, many articles proposed optimizations, implementation, or variants. In this paper, we introduce a new zero-knowledge proof for the syndrome decoding problem on random linear codes. Instead of using permutations like most of the existing protocols, we rely on the MPC-in-the-head paradigm in which we reduce the task of proving the low Hamming weight of the SD solution to proving some relations between specific polynomials. Specifically, we propose a 5-round zero-knowledge protocol that proves the knowledge of a vector x such that y = Hx and wt( x ) ≤ w and which achieves a soundness error closed to 1 /N for an arbitrary N . While turning this protocol into a signature scheme, we achieve a signature size of 11-12 KB for 128-bit security when relying on the hardness of the SD problem on binary fields. Using larger fields (like F 2 8 ), we can produce fast signatures of around 8 KB. This allows us to outperform Picnic3 and to be competitive with SPHINCS + , both post-quantum signature candidates in the ongoing NIST standardization effort. Moreover, our scheme outperforms all the existing code-based signature schemes for the common “signature size + public key size” metric.
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- Publicly Verifiable Zero-Knowledge and Post-Quantum Signatures from VOLE-in-the-HeadCarsten Baum, Lennart Braun, Cyprien Delpech de Saint Guilhem, Michael Klooß 等CRYPTO 2023 · 被引用 75 次
- Short Signatures from Regular Syndrome Decoding in the HeadEliana Carozza, Geoffroy Couteau, Antoine JouxEUROCRYPT 2023 · 被引用 25 次
- Reduction from Sparse LPN to LPN, Dual Attack 3.0Kévin Carrier, Thomas Debris-Alazard, Charles Meyer-Hilfiger, Jean-Pierre TillichEUROCRYPT 2024 · 被引用 13 次
- Amortizing Randomness Cost: Efficient Masked Implementation of SDitH Signatures with Common SharesGuowei Liu, Weijia Wang, Lixuan Wu, Chaoran Wang 等USENIX Security 2026
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