PQConnect: Automated Post-Quantum End-to-End Tunnels
Daniel J. Bernstein, Tanja Lange, Jonathan Levin, Bo-Yin Yang
摘要
—This paper introduces PQConnect, a post-quantum end-to-end tunneling protocol that automatically protects all packets between clients that have installed PQConnect and servers that have installed and configured PQConnect. Like VPNs, PQConnect does not require any changes to higher-level protocols and application software. PQConnect adds cryptographic protection to unencrypted applications, works in concert with existing pre-quantum applications to add post-quantum protection, and adds a second application-independent layer of defense to any applications that have begun to incorporate application-specific post-quantum protection. Unlike VPNs, PQConnect automatically creates end-to-end tunnels to any number of servers using automatic peer discovery, with no need for the client administrator to configure per-server information. Each server carries out a client-independent configuration step to publish an announcement that the server’s name accepts PQConnect connections. Any PQConnect client connecting to that name efficiently finds this announcement, automatically establishes a post-quantum point-to-point IP tunnel to the server, and routes traffic for that name through that tunnel. The foundation of security in PQConnect is the server’s long-term public key used to encrypt and authenticate all PQCon-nect packets. PQConnect makes a conservative choice of post-quantum KEM for this public key. PQConnect also uses a smaller post-quantum KEM for forward secrecy, and elliptic curves to ensure pre-quantum security even
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