GALACTICS: Gaussian Sampling for Lattice-Based Constant- Time Implementation of Cryptographic Signatures, Revisited
Gilles Barthe, Sonia Belaïd, Thomas Espitau, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Mélissa Rossi, Mehdi Tibouchi
摘要
In this paper, we propose a constant-time implementation of the BLISS lattice-based signature scheme. BLISS is possibly the most efficient lattice-based signature scheme proposed so far, with a level of performance on par with widely used pre-quantum primitives like ECDSA. It is only one of the few postquantum signatures to have seen real-world deployment, as part of the strongSwan VPN software suite. The outstanding performance of the BLISS signature scheme stems in large part from its reliance on discrete Gaussian distributions, which allow for better parameters and security reductions. However, that advantage has also proved to be its Achilles' heel, as discrete Gaussians pose serious challenges in terms of secure implementations. Implementations of BLISS so far have included secret-dependent branches and memory accesses, both as part of the discrete Gaussian sampling and of the essential rejection sampling step in signature generation. These defects have led to multiple devastating timing attacks, and were a key reason why BLISS was not submitted to the NIST postquantum standardization effort. In fact, almost all of the actual candidates chose to stay away from Gaussians despite their efficiency advantage, due to the serious concerns surrounding implementation security. Moreover, naive countermeasures will often not cut it: we show that a reasonable-looking countermeasure suggested in previous work to protect the BLISS rejection sampling can again be defeated using novel timing attacks, in which the timing information is fed to phase retrieval machine learning algorithm in order to achieve a full key recovery. Fortunately, we also present careful implementation techniques that allow us to describe an implementation of BLISS with complete timing attack protection, achieving the same level of efficiency as the original unprotected code, without resorting on floating point arithmetic or platform-specific optimizations like AVX intrinsics. These techniques, including a new approach to the polynomial approximation of transcendental function, can also be applied to the masking of the BLISS signature scheme, and will hopefully make more efficient and secure implementations of lattice-based cryptography possible going forward.
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引用它的顶会 Paper4
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- "They're not that hard to mitigate": What Cryptographic Library Developers Think About Timing AttacksJan Jancar, Marcel Fourné, Daniel De Almeida Braga, Mohamed Sabt 等S&P 2022 · 被引用 61 次
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- High-Order Masking of Lattice Signatures in Quasilinear TimeRafaël del Pino, Thomas Prest, Mélissa Rossi, Markku-Juhani O. SaarinenS&P 2023
它引用的顶会 Paper4
- Strong Non-Interference and Type-Directed Higher-Order MaskingGilles Barthe, Sonia Belaïd, François Dupressoir, Pierre-Alain Fouque 等CCS 2016 · 被引用 302 次
- Side-Channel Attacks on BLISS Lattice-Based Signatures: Exploiting Branch Tracing against strongSwan and Electromagnetic Emanations in MicrocontrollersThomas Espitau, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Benoît Gérard, Mehdi TibouchiCCS 2017 · 被引用 145 次
- To BLISS-B or not to be: Attacking strongSwan's Implementation of Post-Quantum SignaturesPeter Pessl, Leon Groot Bruinderink, Yuval YaromCCS 2017 · 被引用 88 次
- Integral Matrix Gram Root and Lattice Gaussian Sampling Without FloatsLéo Ducas, Steven D. Galbraith, Thomas Prest, Yang YuEUROCRYPT 2020 · 被引用 22 次
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