1 Trillion Dollar Refund: How To Spoof PDF Signatures
Vladislav Mladenov, Christian Mainka, Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen, Martin Grothe, Jörg Schwenk
摘要
The Portable Document Format (PDF) is the de-facto standard for document exchange worldwide. To guarantee the authenticity and integrity of documents, digital signatures are used. Several public and private services ranging from governments, public enterprises, banks, and payment services rely on the security of PDF signatures. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive security evaluation on digital signatures in PDFs. We introduce three novel attack classes which bypass the cryptographic protection of digitally signed PDF files allowing an attacker to spoof the content of a signed PDF. We analyzed 22 different PDF viewers and found 21 of them to be vulnerable, including prominent and widely used applications such as Adobe Reader DC and Foxit. We additionally evaluated eight online validation services and found six to be vulnerable. A possible explanation for these results could be the absence of a standard algorithm to verify PDF signatures -each client verifies signatures differently, and attacks can be tailored to these differences. We, therefore, propose the standardization of a secure verification algorithm, which we describe in this paper. All findings have been responsibly disclosed, and the affected vendors were supported during fixing the issues. As a result, three generic CVEs for each attack class were issued [50] [51] [52] . Our research on PDF signatures and more information is also online available at https://www.pdf-insecurity.org/ .
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了最后一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper5
- Practical Decryption exFiltration: Breaking PDF EncryptionJens Müller, Fabian Ising, Vladislav Mladenov, Christian Mainka 等CCS 2019 · 被引用 18 次
- Breaking the Specification: PDF CertificationSimon Rohlmann, Vladislav Mladenov, Christian Mainka, Jörg SchwenkS&P 2021 · 被引用 16 次
- Every Signature is Broken: On the Insecurity of Microsoft Office's OOXML SignaturesSimon Rohlmann, Vladislav Mladenov, Christian Mainka, Daniel Hirschberger 等USENIX Security 2023
- Shadow Attacks: Hiding and Replacing Content in Signed PDFsChristian Mainka, Vladislav Mladenov, Simon RohlmannNDSS 2021
- Oops... Code Execution and Content Spoofing: The First Comprehensive Analysis of OpenDocument SignaturesSimon Rohlmann, Christian Mainka, Vladislav Mladenov, Jörg SchwenkUSENIX Security 2022
它引用的顶会 Paper3
- Extract Me If You Can: Abusing PDF Parsers in Malware DetectorsCurtis Carmony, Xunchao Hu, Heng Yin, Abhishek Vasisht Bhaskar 等NDSS 2016 · 被引用 61 次
- Who Left Open the Cookie Jar? A Comprehensive Evaluation of Third-Party Cookie PoliciesGertjan Franken, Tom van Goethem, Wouter JoosenUSENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 39 次
- PDF Mirage: Content Masking Attack Against Information-Based Online ServicesIan D. Markwood, Dakun Shen, Yao Liu, Zhuo LuUSENIX Security 2017 · 被引用 31 次
相关 Paper
- Processing Dangerous Paths - On Security and Privacy of the Portable Document FormatJens Müller, Dominik Noss, Christian Mainka, Vladislav Mladenov 等NDSS 2021
- "Johnny, you are fired!" - Spoofing OpenPGP and S/MIME Signatures in EmailsJens Müller, Marcus Brinkmann, Damian Poddebniak, Hanno Böck 等USENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 34 次
- From Documentation to Zero-day Vulnerabilities: LLM-Driven Fuzzing of JavaScript Engines in PDF ReadersSuyue Guo, Stijn Pletinckx, Tianle Yu, Yigitcan Kaya 等CCS 2026
- Morpheus: Bringing The (PKCS) One To Meet the OracleMoosa Yahyazadeh, Sze Yiu Chau, Li Li, Man Hong Hue 等CCS 2021 · 被引用 5 次
- Iframes/Popups Are Dangerous in Mobile WebView: Studying and Mitigating Differential Context VulnerabilitiesGuangliang Yang, Jeff Huang, Guofei GuUSENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 21 次
