dRR: A Decentralized, Scalable, and Auditable Architecture for RPKI Repository
Yingying Su, Dan Li, Li Chen, Qi Li, Sitong Ling
摘要
Although Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is critical for securing inter-domain routing, we find that its key component, the RPKI Repository, is under studied. We conduct the first data-driven analysis of the existing RPKI Repository infrastructure, including a survey of worldwide AS administrators and a large-scale measurement of the existing RPKI Repository. Based on the findings of our study, we identify three key problems. Firstly, misbehaving RPKI authorities can easily manipulate RPKI objects, and Internet Number Resources holders (INRs holders) and Relying Parties (RPs) can neither prevent malicious behaviors of misbehaving authorities nor hold them accountable. Secondly, RPKI Repository is sensitive to failures: An attack or downtime of any repository Publication Point (PP) will prevent RPs from obtaining complete RPKI object views. Finally, we identify scalability issues with the current RPKI Repository, which are expected to worsen with the further deployment of Route Origin Authorization (ROA).
To address these problems, we propose dRR, an architecture that enhances the security, robustness, and scalability of the RPKI Repository while being compatible with standard RPKI. By introducing two new entities: Certificate Servers (CSs) and Monitors, dRR forms a decentralized federation of CSs, which enables the RPKI Repository to proactively defend against malicious behavior from authorities and to tolerate PPs' failures. dRR is also scalable for future large-scale deployment. We present the design of dRR in detail and implement a prototype of dRR on a global Internet testbed spanning 15 countries. Experimental results show that, although new security features are introduced, dRR only incurs negligible latency for certificate issuance and revocation. The throughput of certificate updates achieved by dRR is 450 times higher than the current maximum RPKI certificate update frequency. 2 We have summarized all abbreviations used in dRR in Appendix B
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper5
- Pruning the Tree: Rethinking RPKI Architecture from the Ground upHaya Schulmann, Niklas VogelNDSS 2026 · 被引用 1 次
- The Fault in Our Drafts: Vulnerabilities in RPKI Specification and SoftwareOliver Jacobsen, Tobias Kirsch, Haya Schulmann, Niklas Vogel 等S&P 2026
- SoK: An Introspective Analysis of RPKI SecurityDonika Mirdita, Haya Schulmann, Michael WaidnerUSENIX Security 2025
- Crack in the Armor: Underlying Infrastructure Threats to RPKI Publication Point ReachabilityYunhao Liu, Jessie Hui Wang, Yuedong Xu, Zongpeng Li 等NDSS 2026
- Understanding Route Origin Validation (ROV) Deployment in the Real World and Why MANRS Action 1 Is Not FollowedLancheng Qin, Li Chen, Dan Li, Honglin Ye 等NDSS 2024
它引用的顶会 Paper7
- The Honey Badger of BFT ProtocolsAndrew Miller, Yu Xia, Kyle Croman, Elaine Shi 等CCS 2016 · 被引用 974 次
- Byzantine Ordered Consensus without Byzantine OligarchyYunhao Zhang, Srinath T. V. Setty, Qi Chen, Lidong Zhou 等OSDI 2020 · 被引用 131 次
- Kauri: Scalable BFT Consensus with Pipelined Tree-Based Dissemination and AggregationRay Neiheiser, Miguel Matos, Luís E. T. RodriguesSOSP 2021 · 被引用 65 次
- Behind the Scenes of RPKITomas Hlavacek, Philipp Jeitner, Donika Mirdita, Haya Schulmann 等CCS 2022 · 被引用 14 次
- Privacy Preserving and Resilient RPKIKris Shrishak, Haya SchulmannINFOCOM 2021 · 被引用 5 次
相关 Paper
- Are We There Yet? On RPKI's Deployment and SecurityYossi Gilad, Avichai Cohen, Amir Herzberg, Michael Schapira 等NDSS 2017 · 被引用 108 次
- Demystifying RPKI-Invalid Prefixes: Hidden Causes and Security RisksWeitong Li, Tao Wan, Tijay ChungNDSS 2026
- Stalloris: RPKI Downgrade AttackTomas Hlavacek, Philipp Jeitner, Donika Mirdita, Haya Schulmann 等USENIX Security 2022
- ROV-MI: Large-Scale, Accurate and Efficient Measurement of ROV DeploymentWenqi Chen, Zhiliang Wang, Dongqi Han, Chenxin Duan 等NDSS 2022
- Byzantine-Secure Relying Party for Resilient RPKIJens Frieß, Donika Mirdita, Haya Schulmann, Michael WaidnerCCS 2024 · 被引用 1 次
