Protect Privacy from Gradient Leakage Attack in Federated Learning

Federated Learning (FL) is susceptible to gradient leakage attacks, as recent studies show the feasibility of obtaining private training data on clients from publicly shared gradients. Existing work solves this problem by incorporating a series of privacy protection mechanisms, such as homomorphic encryption and local differential privacy to prevent data leakage. However, these solutions either incur significant communication and computation costs, or significant training accuracy loss. In this paper, we show that the sensitivity of gradient changes w.r.t. training data is an essential measure of information leakage risk. Based on this observation, we present a novel defense, whose intuition is perturbing gradients to match information leakage risk such that the defense overhead is lightweight while privacy protection is adequate. Our another key observation is that global correlations of gradients could compensate for this perturbation. Based on such compensation, training can achieve guaranteed accuracy. We conduct experiments on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10 for defending against two gradient leakage attacks. Without sacrificing accuracy, the results demonstrate that our lightweight defense can decrease the PSNR and SSIM between the reconstructed images and raw images by up to more than 60% for both two attacks, compared with baseline defensive methods.