Telekine: Secure Computing with Cloud GPUs
Tyler Hunt, Zhipeng Jia, Vance Miller, Ariel Szekely, Yige Hu, Christopher J. Rossbach, Emmett Witchel
摘要
GPUs have become ubiquitous in the cloud due to the dramatic performance gains they enable in domains such as machine learning and computer vision. However, offloading GPU computation to the cloud requires placing enormous trust in providers and administrators. Recent proposals for GPU trusted execution environments (TEEs) are promising but fail to address very real side-channel concerns. To illustrate the severity of the problem, we demonstrate a novel attack that enables an attacker to correctly classify images from ImageNet [17] by observing only the timing of GPU kernel execution, rather than the images themselves.
Telekine enables applications to use GPU acceleration in the cloud securely, based on a novel GPU stream abstraction that ensures execution and interaction through untrusted components are independent of any secret data. Given a GPU with support for a TEE, Telekine employs a novel variant of API remoting to partition application-level software into components to ensure secret-dependent behaviors occur only on trusted components. Telekine can securely train modern image recognition models on MXNet [10] with 10%-22% performance penalty relative to an insecure baseline with a locally attached GPU. It runs graph algorithms using Galois [75] on one and two GPUs with 18%-41% overhead.
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引用它的顶会 Paper27
- Hermes Attack: Steal DNN Models with Lossless Inference AccuracyYuankun Zhu, Yueqiang Cheng, Husheng Zhou, Yantao LuUSENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 119 次
- ShEF: shielded enclaves for cloud FPGAsMark Zhao, Mingyu Gao, Christos KozyrakisASPLOS 2022 · 被引用 53 次
- Honeycomb: Secure and Efficient GPU Executions via Static ValidationHaohui Mai, Jiacheng Zhao, Hongren Zheng, Yiyang Zhao 等OSDI 2023 · 被引用 39 次
- StrongBox: A GPU TEE on Arm EndpointsYunjie Deng, Chenxu Wang, Shunchang Yu, Shiqing Liu 等CCS 2022 · 被引用 37 次
- ACAI: Protecting Accelerator Execution with Arm Confidential Computing ArchitectureSupraja Sridhara, Andrin Bertschi, Benedict Schlüter, Mark Kuhne 等USENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 36 次
它引用的顶会 Paper9
- Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order ExecutionJo Van Bulck, Marina Minkin, Ofir Weisse, Daniel Genkin 等USENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 1,175 次
- Oblivious Neural Network Predictions via MiniONN TransformationsJian Liu, Mika Juuti, Yao Lu, N. AsokanCCS 2017 · 被引用 800 次
- Oblivious Multi-Party Machine Learning on Trusted ProcessorsOlga Ohrimenko, Felix Schuster, Cédric Fournet, Aastha Mehta 等USENIX Security 2016 · 被引用 594 次
- ZombieLoad: Cross-Privilege-Boundary Data SamplingMichael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Daniel Moghimi, Jo Van Bulck 等CCS 2019 · 被引用 464 次
- Rendered Insecure: GPU Side Channel Attacks are PracticalHoda Naghibijouybari, Ajaya Neupane, Zhiyun Qian, Nael B. Abu-GhazalehCCS 2018 · 被引用 214 次
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