Attacks on Wireless Coexistence: Exploiting Cross-Technology Performance Features for Inter-Chip Privilege Escalation
Jiska Classen, Francesco Gringoli, Michael Hermann, Matthias Hollick
摘要
Modern mobile devices feature multiple wireless technologies, such as Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and LTE. Each of them is implemented within a separate wireless chip, sometimes packaged as combo chips. However, these chips share components and resources, such as the same antenna or wireless spectrum. Wireless coexistence interfaces enable them to schedule packets without collisions despite shared resources, essential to maximizing networking performance. Today’s hardwired coexistence interfaces hinder clear security boundaries and separation between chips and chip components. This paper shows practical coexistence attacks on Broadcom, Cypress, and Silicon Labs chips deployed in billions of devices. For example, we demonstrate that a Bluetooth chip can directly extract network passwords and manipulate traffic on a Wi-Fi chip. Coexistence attacks enable a novel type of lateral privilege escalation across chip boundaries. We responsibly disclosed the vulnerabilities to the vendors. Yet, only partial fixes were released for existing hardware since wireless chips would need to be redesigned from the ground up to prevent the presented attacks on coexistence.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper6
- SoK: The Long Journey of Exploiting and Defending the Legacy of King Harald BluetoothJianliang Wu, Ruoyu Wu, Dongyan Xu, Dave Jing Tian 等S&P 2024 · 被引用 22 次
- ChainReactor: Automated Privilege Escalation Chain Discovery via AI PlanningGiulio De Pasquale, Ilya Grishchenko, Riccardo Iesari, Gabriel Pizarro 等USENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 15 次
- To Boldly Go Where No Fuzzer Has Gone Before: Finding Bugs in Linux' Wireless Stacks through VirtIO DevicesSönke Huster, Matthias Hollick, Jiska ClassenS&P 2024 · 被引用 8 次
- Pitfalls for Security Isolation in Multi-CPU SystemsSimeon Hoffmann, Nils Ole TippenhauerNDSS 2026
- The Most Dangerous Codec in the World: Finding and Exploiting Vulnerabilities in H.264 DecodersWilly R. Vasquez, Stephen Checkoway, Hovav ShachamUSENIX Security 2023
它引用的顶会 Paper5
- Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative ExecutionPaul Kocher, Jann Horn, Anders Fogh, Daniel Genkin 等S&P 2019 · 被引用 2,435 次
- Screaming Channels: When Electromagnetic Side Channels Meet Radio TransceiversGiovanni Camurati, Sebastian Poeplau, Marius Muench, Tom Hayes 等CCS 2018 · 被引用 186 次
- A Billion Open Interfaces for Eve and Mallory: MitM, DoS, and Tracking Attacks on iOS and macOS Through Apple Wireless Direct LinkMilan Stute, Sashank Narain, Alex Mariotto, Alexander Heinrich 等USENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 59 次
- LIGHTBLUE: Automatic Profile-Aware Debloating of Bluetooth StacksJianliang Wu, Ruoyu Wu, Daniele Antonioli, Mathias Payer 等USENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 38 次
- Frankenstein: Advanced Wireless Fuzzing to Exploit New Bluetooth Escalation TargetsJan Ruge, Jiska Classen, Francesco Gringoli, Matthias HollickUSENIX Security 2020
相关 Paper
- BlueFi: bluetooth over WiFiHsun-Wei Cho, Kang G. ShinSIGCOMM 2021 · 被引用 42 次
- BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackSDaniele Antonioli, Nils Ole Tippenhauer, Kasper RasmussenS&P 2020 · 被引用 90 次
- Component Security Ten Years Later: An Empirical Study of Cross-Layer Threats in Real-World Mobile ApplicationsKeke Lian, Lei Zhang, Guangliang Yang, Shuo Mao 等FSE 2024 · 被引用 5 次
- Practical Attacks Against Privacy and Availability in 4G/LTE Mobile Communication SystemsAltaf Shaik, Jean-Pierre Seifert, Ravishankar Borgaonkar, N. Asokan 等NDSS 2016 · 被引用 342 次
- Exploiting Inaccurate Branch History in Side-Channel AttacksYuhui Zhu, Alessandro BiondiUSENIX Security 2025
