Is Nobody There? Good! Globally Measuring Connection Tampering Without Responsive Endhosts
Sadia Nourin, Erik C. Rye, Kevin Bock, Nguyen Phong Hoang, Dave Levin
摘要
Many techniques have been introduced to measure network interference-tampering performed by nation-state censors or corporate firewalls to block unwanted traffic. However, virtually all prior measurement techniques require some degree of participation from endpoints within each country of study: including VPNs, cloud providers, or volunteers willing to run measurement software on their personal devices at their own risk. However, such endpoints are not always available in all countries that tamper with connections, leaving many networks unmeasurable.
In this paper, we present the first global, active, network interference measurements that require no participating endpoints within any country of study. Our techniques extend two recent studies that use packet sequences that trigger network interference from outside the country of study by tricking middleboxes into believing a connection exists. Our system, Mint, generalizes and automates this approach-which had previously only been applied to two countries-to allow it to apply to the global IPv4 and IPv6 Internet. We use Mint to conduct the first global measurements of network interference without using any participating endpoints, and the first comprehensive scans of IPv6 interference. We show that we are able to measure networks, autonomous systems, and even entire countries that previous methods could not. We also present several case studies that highlight how our tool can be used to perform new measurement studies of network interference.
- Rented VPNs and cloud providers typically do not have this limitation.
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- ICLab: A Global, Longitudinal Internet Censorship Measurement PlatformArian Akhavan Niaki, Shinyoung Cho, Zachary Weinberg, Nguyen Phong Hoang 等S&P 2020 · 被引用 94 次
- Augur: Internet-Wide Detection of Connectivity DisruptionsPaul Pearce, Roya Ensafi, Frank Li, Nick Feamster 等S&P 2017 · 被引用 84 次
- Censored Planet: An Internet-wide, Longitudinal Censorship ObservatoryRam Sundara Raman, Prerana Shenoy, Katharina Kohls, Roya EnsafiCCS 2020 · 被引用 68 次
- Quack: Scalable Remote Measurement of Application-Layer CensorshipBenjamin VanderSloot, Allison McDonald, Will Scott, J. Alex Halderman 等USENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 66 次
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