Towards Primary User Sybil-proofness for Online Spectrum Auction in Dynamic Spectrum Access

Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) is a promising platform to solve the spectrum shortage problem, in which auction based mechanisms have been extensively studied due to good spectrum allocation efficiency and fairness. Recently, Sybil attacks were introduced in DSA, and Sybil-proof spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed, which guarantee that each single secondary user (SU) cannot obtain a higher utility under more than one fictitious identities. However, existing Sybil-poof spectrum auction mechanisms achieve only Sybil-proofness for SUs, but not for primary users (PUs), and simulations show that a cheating PU in those mechanisms can obtain a higher utility by Sybil attacks. In this paper, we propose TSUNAMI, the first Truthful and primary user Sybil-proof aUctioN mechAnisM for onlIne spectrum allocation. Specifically, we compute the opportunity cost of each SU and screen out cost-efficient SUs to participate in spectrum allocation. In addition, we present a bid-independent sorting method and a sequential matching approach to achieve primary user Sybil-proofness and 2-D truthfulness, which means that each SU or PU can gain her maximal utility by bidding with her true valuation of spectrum. We evaluate the performance and validate the desired properties of our proposed mechanism through extensive simulations.