Automated Discovery of Cross-Plane Event-Based Vulnerabilities in Software-Defined Networking
Benjamin E. Ujcich, Samuel Jero, Richard Skowyra, Steven R. Gomez, Adam Bates, William H. Sanders, Hamed Okhravi
摘要
—Software-defined networking (SDN) achieves a programmable control plane through the use of logically centralized, event-driven controllers and through network applications (apps) that extend the controllers’ functionality. As control plane decisions are often based on the data plane, it is possible for carefully crafted malicious data plane inputs to direct the control plane towards unwanted states that bypass network security restrictions ( i.e., cross-plane attacks ). Unfortunately, because of the complex interplay among controllers, apps, and data plane inputs, at present it is difficult to systematically identify and analyze these cross-plane vulnerabilities. We present E VENT S COPE , a vulnerability detection tool that automatically analyzes SDN control plane event usage, discovers candidate vulnerabilities based on missing event-handling routines, and validates vulnerabilities based on data plane effects. To accurately detect missing event handlers without ground truth or developer aid, we cluster apps according to similar event usage and mark inconsistencies as candidates. We create an event flow graph to observe a global view of events and control flows within the control plane and use it to validate vulnerabilities that affect the data plane. We applied E VENT S COPE to the ONOS SDN controller and uncovered 14 new vulnerabilities.
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引用它的顶会 Paper5
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- Attacking the Brain: Races in the SDN Control PlaneLei Xu, Jeff Huang, Sungmin Hong, Jialong Zhang 等USENIX Security 2017 · 被引用 77 次
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