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ICML2023顶会

Doubly Optimal No-Regret Learning in Monotone Games

Yang Cai, Weiqiang Zheng

2023年份
23被引次数
19顶会引用

摘要

We consider online learning in multi-player smooth monotone games. Existing algorithms have limitations such as (1) being only applicable to strongly monotone games; (2) lacking the no-regret guarantee; (3) having only asymptotic or slow O(1T)O(\frac{1}{\sqrt{T}}) last-iterate convergence rate to a Nash equilibrium. While the O(1T)O(\frac{1}{\sqrt{T}}) rate is tight for a large class of algorithms including the well-studied extragradient algorithm and optimistic gradient algorithm, it is not optimal for all gradient-based algorithms. We propose the accelerated optimistic gradient (AOG) algorithm, the first doubly optimal no-regret learning algorithm for smooth monotone games. Namely, our algorithm achieves both (i) the optimal O(T)O(\sqrt{T}) regret in the adversarial setting under smooth and convex loss functions and (ii) the optimal O(1T)O(\frac{1}{T}) last-iterate convergence rate to a Nash equilibrium in multi-player smooth monotone games. As a byproduct of the accelerated last-iterate convergence rate, we further show that each player suffers only an O(log⁡T)O(\log T) individual worst-case dynamic regret, providing an exponential improvement over the previous state-of-the-art O(T)O(\sqrt{T}) bound.

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