Blitz: Secure Multi-Hop Payments Without Two-Phase Commits
Lukas Aumayr, Pedro Moreno-Sanchez, Aniket Kate, Matteo Maffei
摘要
Payment-channel networks (PCN) are the most prominent approach to tackle the scalability issues of current permissionless blockchains. A PCN reduces the load on-chain by allowing arbitrarily many off-chain multi-hop payments (MHPs) between any two users connected through a path of payment channels. Unfortunately, current MHP protocols are far from satisfactory. One-round MHPs (e.g., Interledger) are insecure as a malicious intermediary can steal the payment funds. Two-round MHPs (e.g., Lightning Network (LN)) follow the 2-phase-commit paradigm as in databases to overcome this issue. However, when tied with economical incentives, 2-phasecommit brings other security threats (i.e., wormhole attacks), staggered collateral (i.e., funds are locked for a time proportional to the payment path length) and dependency on specific scripting language functionality (e.g., Hash Time-Lock Contracts) that hinders a wider deployment in practice. We present Blitz, a novel MHP protocol that demonstrates for the first time that we can achieve the best of the two worlds: a single round MHP where no malicious intermediary can steal coins. Moreover, Blitz provides the same privacy for sender and receiver as current MHP protocols do, is not prone to the wormhole attack and requires only constant collateral. Additionally, we construct MHPs using only digital signatures and a timelock functionality, both available at the core of virtually every cryptocurrency today. We provide the cryptographic details of Blitz and we formally prove its security. Furthermore, our experimental evaluation on a LN snapshot shows that (i) staggered collateral in LN leads to in between 4x and 33x more unsuccessful payments than the constant collateral in Blitz; (ii) Blitz reduces the size of the payment contract by 26%; and (iii) Blitz prevents up to 0.3 BTC (3397 USD in October 2020) in fees being stolen over a three day period as it avoids wormhole attacks by design.
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引用它的顶会 Paper11
- Thora: Atomic and Privacy-Preserving Multi-Channel UpdatesLukas Aumayr, Kasra Abbaszadeh, Matteo MaffeiCCS 2022 · 被引用 20 次
- LedgerLocks: A Security Framework for Blockchain Protocols Based on Adaptor SignaturesErkan Tairi, Pedro Moreno-Sanchez, Clara SchneidewindCCS 2023 · 被引用 10 次
- Payout Races and Congested Channels: A Formal Analysis of Security in the Lightning NetworkBen Weintraub, Satwik Prabhu Kumble, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, Stefanie RoosCCS 2024 · 被引用 5 次
- Securing Lightning Channels against Rational MinersLukas Aumayr, Zeta Avarikioti, Matteo Maffei, Subhra MazumdarCCS 2024 · 被引用 4 次
- Breaking and Fixing Virtual Channels: Domino Attack and DonnerLukas Aumayr, Pedro Moreno-Sanchez, Aniket Kate, Matteo MaffeiNDSS 2023
它引用的顶会 Paper5
- Concurrency and Privacy with Payment-Channel NetworksGiulio Malavolta, Pedro Moreno-Sanchez, Aniket Kate, Matteo Maffei 等CCS 2017 · 被引用 307 次
- Anonymous Multi-Hop Locks for Blockchain Scalability and InteroperabilityGiulio Malavolta, Pedro Moreno-Sanchez, Clara Schneidewind, Aniket Kate 等NDSS 2019 · 被引用 305 次
- Settling Payments Fast and Private: Efficient Decentralized Routing for Path-Based TransactionsStefanie Roos, Pedro Moreno-Sanchez, Aniket Kate, Ian GoldbergNDSS 2018 · 被引用 246 次
- Atomic Multi-Channel Updates with Constant Collateral in Bitcoin-Compatible Payment-Channel NetworksChristoph Egger, Pedro Moreno-Sanchez, Matteo MaffeiCCS 2019 · 被引用 108 次
- Cross-chain Deals and Adversarial CommerceMaurice Herlihy, Liuba Shrira, Barbara LiskovVLDB 2020 · 被引用 61 次
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