Unveiling Hardware-based Data Prefetcher, a Hidden Source of Information Leakage

Data prefetching is a hardware-based optimization mechanism used in most of the modern microprocessors. It fetches data to the cache before it is needed. In this paper, we present a novel microarchitectural attack that exploits the prefetching mechanism. Our attack targets Instruction pointer (IP)-based stride prefetching in Intel processors. Stride prefetcher detects memory access patterns with a regular stride, which are likely to be found in lookup table-based cryptographic implementations. By monitoring the prefetching activities near the lookup table, attackers can extract sensitive information such as secret keys from victim applications. This kind of leakage from prefetching has never been considered in the design of constant time algorithm to prevent side-channel attacks. We show the potential of the proposed attack by applying it against the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithm built upon the latest version of OpenSSL library. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first microarchitectural side-channel attack exploiting the hardware prefetching of modern microprocessors.