Session Logical Relations for Noninterference

Information flow control type systems statically restrict the propagation of sensitive data to ensure end-to-end confidentiality. The property to be shown is noninterference, asserting that an attacker cannot infer any secrets from made observations. Session types delimit the kinds of observations that can be made along a communication channel by imposing a protocol of message exchange. These protocols govern the exchange along a single channel and leave unconstrained the propagation along adjacent channels. This paper contributes an information flow control type system for linear session types. The type system stands in close correspondence with intuitionistic linear logic. Intuitionistic linear logic typing ensures that process configurations form a tree such that client processes are parent nodes and provider processes child nodes. To control the propagation of secret messages, the type system is enriched with secrecy levels and arranges these levels to be aligned with the configuration tree. Two levels are associated with every process: the maximal secrecy denoting the process' security clearance and the running secrecy denoting the highest level of secret information obtained so far. The computational semantics naturally stratifies process configurations such that higher-secrecy processes are parents of lower-secrecy ones, an invariant enforced by typing. Noninterference is stated in terms of a logical relation that is indexed by the secrecy-level-enriched session types. The logical relation contributes a novel development of logical relations for session typed languages as it considers open configurations, allowing for more nuanced equivalence statement.

• development of an flow-sensitive IFC type system for binary session types, yielding the language SILL sec ;

• proofs of type safety and noninterference of SILL sec ;