Pspray: Timing Side-Channel based Linux Kernel Heap Exploitation Technique
Yoochan Lee, Jinhan Kwak, Junesoo Kang, Yuseok Jeon, Byoungyoung Lee
摘要
The stealthiness of an attack is the most vital consideration for an attacker to reach their goals without being detected. Therefore, attackers put in a great deal of effort to increase the success rate of attacks in order not to expose information on the attacker and attack attempts resulting from failures. Exploitation of the kernel, which is a prime target for the attacker, usually takes advantage of heap-based vulnerabilities, and these exploits' success rates fortunately remain low (e.g., 56.1% on average) due to the operating principle of the default Linux kernel heap allocator, SLUB. This paper presents PSPRAY, a timing side-channel attackbased exploitation technique that significantly increases the success probability of exploitation. According to our evaluation, with 10 real-world vulnerabilities, PSPRAY significantly improves the success rate of all those vulnerabilities (e.g., from 56.1% to 97.92% on average). To prevent this exploitation technique from being abused by the attacker, we further introduce a new defense mechanism to mitigate the threat of PSPRAY. After applying mitigation, the overall success rate of PSPRAY becomes similar to that from before using PSPRAY with negligible performance overhead (0.25%) and memory overhead (0.52%).
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引用它的顶会 Paper16
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它引用的顶会 Paper9
- Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative ExecutionPaul Kocher, Jann Horn, Anders Fogh, Daniel Genkin 等S&P 2019 · 被引用 2,435 次
- Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User SpaceMoritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas Prescher 等USENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 1,456 次
- Prime+Abort: A Timer-Free High-Precision L3 Cache Attack using Intel TSXCraig Disselkoen, David Kohlbrenner, Leo Porter, Dean M. TullsenUSENIX Security 2017 · 被引用 186 次
- Breaking Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization with Intel TSXYeongjin Jang, Sangho Lee, Taesoo KimCCS 2016 · 被引用 174 次
- PAC it up: Towards Pointer Integrity using ARM Pointer AuthenticationHans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman, Kui Wang, Carlos Chinea Perez 等USENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 168 次
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