Multi-channel Autobidding with Budget and ROI Constraints
Yuan Deng, Negin Golrezaei, Patrick Jaillet, Jason Cheuk Nam Liang, Vahab Mirrokni
摘要
In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc., each of which consists of numerous ad auctions. We study how an advertiser maximizes total conversion (e.g. ad clicks) while satisfying aggregate return-on-investment (ROI) and budget constraints across all channels. In practice, an advertiser does not have control over, and thus cannot globally optimize, which individual ad auctions she participates in for each channel, and instead authorizes a channel to procure impressions on her behalf: the advertiser can only utilize two levers on each channel, namely setting a per-channel budget and per-channel target ROI. In this work, we first analyze the effectiveness of each of these levers for solving the advertiser's global multi-channel problem. We show that when an advertiser only optimizes over per-channel ROIs, her total conversion can be arbitrarily worse than what she could have obtained in the global problem. Further, we show that the advertiser can achieve the global optimal conversion when she only optimizes over per-channel budgets. In light of this finding, under a bandit feedback setting that mimics real-world scenarios where advertisers have limited information on ad auctions in each channels and how channels procure ads, we present an efficient learning algorithm that produces per-channel budgets whose resulting conversion approximates that of the global optimal problem. Finally, we argue that all our results hold for both single-item and multi-item auctions from which channels procure impressions on advertisers' behalf.
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引用它的顶会 Paper17
- Online Learning under Budget and ROI Constraints via Weak AdaptivityMatteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Christian KroerICML 2024 · 被引用 12 次
- Individual Welfare Guarantees in the Autobidding World with Machine-learned AdviceYuan Deng, Negin Golrezaei, Patrick Jaillet, Jason Cheuk Nam Liang 等WWW 2024 · 被引用 11 次
- Online Ad Procurement in Non-stationary Autobidding WorldsJason Cheuk Nam Liang, Haihao Lu, Baoyu ZhouNeurIPS 2023 · 被引用 10 次
- Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget ConstraintsChristopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Wennan ZhuWWW 2024 · 被引用 10 次
- Interpolating Item and User Fairness in Multi-Sided RecommendationsQinyi Chen, Jason Cheuk Nam Liang, Negin Golrezaei, Djallel BouneffoufNeurIPS 2024 · 被引用 8 次
它引用的顶会 Paper8
- Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding WorldSantiago R. Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab S. Mirrokni 等NeurIPS 2021 · 被引用 95 次
- Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding WorldYuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song ZuoWWW 2021 · 被引用 87 次
- A Unifying Framework for Online Optimization with Long-Term ConstraintsMatteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Alberto Marchesi, Giulia Romano 等NeurIPS 2022 · 被引用 59 次
- Auction Design in an Auto-bidding Setting: Randomization Improves Efficiency Beyond VCGAranyak MehtaWWW 2022 · 被引用 41 次
- Generalized Linear Bandits with Local Differential PrivacyYuxuan Han, Zhipeng Liang, Yang Wang, Jiheng ZhangNeurIPS 2021 · 被引用 39 次
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