CHERI-SIMT: Implementing Capability Memory Protection in GPUs
Matthew Naylor, Alexandre Joannou, A. Theodore Markettos, Paul Metzger, Simon W. Moore, Timothy M. Jones
摘要
Governments are increasingly advising software manufacturers to employ memory-safe languages and technologies to combat adversarial attacks on modern computing infrastructure. This introduces pressures across the entire computing industry, including GPU vendors who provide implementations of unsafe C/C++-based languages, such as CUDA and OpenCL, for programming the devices they produce. One of the memory-safety technologies being recommended is Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI). CHERI builds strong and efficient memory safety into underlying instruction-set architectures allowing continued, but memory-safe, use of C/C++-based languages on top.
问问这篇 Paper
问问你的智能体。
Lune 读过与它相关的顶会 Paper,每个回答都会注明依据哪几篇。
相关 Paper
- Formal Mechanised Semantics of CHERI C: Capabilities, Undefined Behaviour, and ProvenanceVadim Zaliva, Kayvan Memarian, Ricardo Almeida, Jessica Clarke 等ASPLOS 2024 · 被引用 6 次
- BLACKOUT: Data-Oblivious Computation with Blinded CapabilitiesHossam ElAtali, Merve Gülmez, Thomas Nyman, N. AsokanCCS 2025
- Rigorous engineering for hardware security: Formal modelling and proof in the CHERI design and implementation processKyndylan Nienhuis, Alexandre Joannou, Thomas Bauereiss, Anthony C. J. Fox 等S&P 2020 · 被引用 43 次
- Descend: A Safe GPU Systems Programming LanguageBastian Köpcke, Sergei Gorlatch, Michel SteuwerPLDI 2024 · 被引用 7 次
- Mon CHERI: Mitigating Uninitialized Memory Access with Conditional CapabilitiesMerve Gülmez, Håkan Englund, Jan Tobias Mühlberg, Thomas NymanS&P 2025
