Power Side-Channel Vulnerability Assessment of Lightweight Cryptographic Scheme, XOODYAK

This work presents a power side-channel analysis (SCA) of a lightweight cryptography (LWC) algorithm, XOODYAK, implemented on an FPGA. First, we perform generic leakage detection tests for two phases of authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) mode, namely INITIALIZE, and ABSORB. Second, we develop novel hypothetical attack models for correlation power analysis (CPA) and demonstrate a success rate (SR) of 92%/82% and minimum-traces-to-disclosure (MTD)=13K/38K on the INITIALIZE/ABSORB phases, respectively. Third, we evaluate ABSORB against Profiled SCA using convolutional neural network (CNN), and achieve SR=96%/64% and MTD=2K/16K on the test set for the same/different keys used for training, respectively. Finally, we suggest low-overhead countermeasures to protect against these SCA attacks.