Practical Non-interactive Encrypted Conjunctive Search with Leakage Suppression
Yunling Wang, Shi-Feng Sun, Jianfeng Wang, Xiaofeng Chen, Joseph K. Liu, Dawu Gu
摘要
Encrypted conjunctive search enables server to perform efficient conjunctive query over encrypted data while guaranteeing data and query privacy. The well-known Oblivious Cross-Tags (OXT) protocol (by Cash et al. in CRYPTO 2013) is the first to realize efficient conjunctive search with some well-defined leakage, such as the keyword pair result pattern (KPRP) leakage and the cross-query intersection result pattern (IP) leakage. To mitigate the potential threats brought by the leakage, much effort has been made to reduce the information leaked by OXT. However, it is still open to achieve encrypted conjunctive search without revealing both KPRP and IP, while preserving high-efficiency.
问问这篇 Paper
问问你的智能体。
Lune 读过与它相关的顶会 Paper,每个回答都会注明依据哪几篇。
引用它的顶会 Paper1
问问它们各自怎么用它相关 Paper
- Result Pattern Hiding Searchable Encryption for Conjunctive QueriesShangqi Lai, Sikhar Patranabis, Amin Sakzad, Joseph K. Liu 等CCS 2018 · 被引用 216 次
- Differentially Private Access in Encrypted Search: Achieving Privacy at a Small Cost?Daniel Pöllmann, Tianxin TangCCS 2025
- Scalable Equi-Join Queries over Encrypted DatabaseKai Du, Jianfeng Wang, Jiaojiao Wu, Yunling WangCCS 2024 · 被引用 6 次
- All Your Queries Are Belong to Us: The Power of File-Injection Attacks on Searchable EncryptionYupeng Zhang, Jonathan Katz, Charalampos PapamanthouUSENIX Security 2016 · 被引用 512 次
- Hiding the Access Pattern is Not Enough: Exploiting Search Pattern Leakage in Searchable EncryptionSimon Oya, Florian KerschbaumUSENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 152 次
