Extension Breakdown: Security Analysis of Browsers Extension Resources Control Policies
Iskander Sánchez-Rola, Igor Santos, Davide Balzarotti
摘要
All major web browsers support browser extensions to add new features and extend their functionalities. Nevertheless, browser extensions have been the target of several attacks due to their tight relation with the browser environment. As a consequence, extensions have been abused in the past for malicious tasks such as private information gathering, browsing history retrieval, or passwords theft -leading to a number of severe targeted attacks.
Even though no protection techniques existed in the past to secure extensions, all browsers now implement defensive countermeasures that, in theory, protect extensions and their resources from third party access. In this paper, we present two attacks that bypass these control techniques in every major browser family, enabling enumeration attacks against the list of installed extensions. In particular, we present a timing side-channel attack against the access control settings and an attack that takes advantage of poor programming practice, affecting a large number of Safari extensions. Due to the harmful nature of our findings, we also discuss possible countermeasures against our own attacks and reported our findings and countermeasures to the different actors involved. We believe that our study can help secure current implementations and help developers to avoid similar attacks in the future.
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引用它的顶会 Paper20
- Clock Around the Clock: Time-Based Device FingerprintingIskander Sánchez-Rola, Igor Santos, Davide BalzarottiCCS 2018 · 被引用 91 次
- EmPoWeb: Empowering Web Applications with Browser ExtensionsDolière Francis SoméS&P 2019 · 被引用 60 次
- Fingerprinting in Style: Detecting Browser Extensions via Injected Style SheetsPierre Laperdrix, Oleksii Starov, Quan Chen, Alexandros Kapravelos 等USENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 49 次
- Demystifying Resource Management Risks in Emerging Mobile App-in-App EcosystemsHaoran Lu, Luyi Xing, Yue Xiao, Yifan Zhang 等CCS 2020 · 被引用 48 次
- Everyone is Different: Client-side Diversification for Defending Against Extension FingerprintingErik Trickel, Oleksii Starov, Alexandros Kapravelos, Nick Nikiforakis 等USENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 43 次
它引用的顶会 Paper2
- Beauty and the Beast: Diverting Modern Web Browsers to Build Unique Browser FingerprintsPierre Laperdrix, Walter Rudametkin, Benoit BaudryS&P 2016 · 被引用 279 次
- CrossFire: An Analysis of Firefox Extension-Reuse VulnerabilitiesAhmet Salih Buyukkayhan, Kaan Onarlioglu, William K. Robertson, Engin KirdaNDSS 2016 · 被引用 22 次
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