ProFlip: Targeted Trojan Attack with Progressive Bit Flips
Huili Chen, Cheng Fu, Jishen Zhao, Farinaz Koushanfar
摘要
The security of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) is of great importance due to their employment in various safety-critical applications. DNNs are shown to be vulnerable against the Trojan attack that manipulates model parameters via poisoned training and gets activated by the pre-defined trigger during inference. In this work, we present ProFlip, the first targeted Trojan attack framework that can divert the prediction of the DNN to the target class by progressively identifying and flipping a small set of bits in model parameters. At its core, ProFlip consists of three key phases: (i) Determining significant neurons in the last layer; (ii) Generating an effective trigger pattern for the tar-get class; (iii) Identifying a sequence of susceptible bits of DNN parameters stored in the main memory (e.g., DRAM). After model deployment, the adversary can insert the Trojan by flipping the critical bits found by ProFlip using bit flip techniques such as Row Hammer or laser beams. As the result, the altered DNN predicts the target class when the trigger pattern is present in any inputs. We perform extensive evaluations of ProFlip on CIFAR10, SVHN, and ImageNet datasets with ResNet-18 and VGG-16 architectures. Empirical results show that, to reach an attack success rate (ASR) of over 94%, ProFlip requires only 12 bit flips out of 88 million parameter bits for ResNet-18 with CIFAR-10, and 15 bit flips for ResNet-18 with ImageNet. Compared to the SOTA, ProFlip reduces the number of required bits flips by 28× ∼ 34× while reaching the same or higher ASR.
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引用它的顶会 Paper31
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它引用的顶会 Paper9
- Neural Cleanse: Identifying and Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in Neural NetworksBolun Wang, Yuanshun Yao, Shawn Shan, Huiying Li 等S&P 2019 · 被引用 1,801 次
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- Bit-Flip Attack: Crushing Neural Network With Progressive Bit SearchAdnan Siraj Rakin, Zhezhi He, Deliang FanICCV 2019 · 被引用 309 次
- Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer DefensesDaniel Gruss, Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Genkin 等S&P 2018 · 被引用 288 次
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