Pudding: Private User Discovery in Anonymity Networks
Ceren Kocaogullar, Daniel Hugenroth, Martin Kleppmann, Alastair R. Beresford
摘要
Anonymity networks allow messaging with metadata privacy, providing better privacy than popular encrypted messaging applications. However, contacting a user on an anonymity network currently requires knowing their public key or similar high-entropy information, as these systems lack a privacy-preserving mechanism for contacting a user via a short, human-readable username. Previous research suggests that this is a barrier to widespread adoption.In this paper we propose Pudding, a novel private user discovery protocol that allows a user to be contacted on an anonymity network knowing only their email address. Our protocol hides contact relationships between users, prevents impersonation, and conceals which usernames are registered on the network. Pudding is Byzantine fault tolerant, remaining available and secure as long as less than one third of servers are crashed, unavailable, or malicious. It can be deployed on Loopix and Nym without changes to the underlying anonymity network protocol, and it supports mobile devices with intermittent network connectivity. We demonstrate the practicality of Pudding with a prototype using the Nym anonymity network. We also formally define the security and privacy goals of our protocol and conduct a thorough analysis to assess its compliance with these definitions.
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引用它的顶会 Paper3
- Arke: Scalable and Byzantine Fault Tolerant Privacy-Preserving Contact DiscoveryNicolas Mohnblatt, Alberto Sonnino, Kobi Gurkan, Philipp JovanovicCCS 2024 · 被引用 2 次
- The SecureDrop Protocol: End-to-End Encrypted Whistleblowing for AllGiulio Berra, Felix Linker, Luca Maier, Cory Francis Myers 等CCS 2026
- Sabot: Efficient and Strongly Anonymous Bootstrapping of Communication ChannelsChristoph Coijanovic, Laura Hetz, Kenneth G. Paterson, Thorsten StrufeCCS 2025
它引用的顶会 Paper4
- The Loopix Anonymity SystemAnia M. Piotrowska, Jamie Hayes, Tariq Elahi, Sebastian Meiser 等USENIX Security 2017 · 被引用 214 次
- Mobile Private Contact Discovery at ScaleDaniel Kales, Christian Rechberger, Thomas Schneider, Matthias Senker 等USENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 157 次
- Arke: Scalable and Byzantine Fault Tolerant Privacy-Preserving Contact DiscoveryNicolas Mohnblatt, Alberto Sonnino, Kobi Gurkan, Philipp JovanovicCCS 2024 · 被引用 2 次
- All the Numbers are US: Large-scale Abuse of Contact Discovery in Mobile MessengersChristoph Hagen, Christian Weinert, Christoph Sendner, Alexandra Dmitrienko 等NDSS 2021
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