Lune

CCS2026顶会

Olingo: Threshold Lattice Signatures with DKG and Identifiable Abort

Kamil Doruk Gur, Patrick Hough, Jonathan Katz, Caroline Sandsbråten, Tjerand Silde

出版方
2026年份

摘要

We present Olingo, a framework for threshold lattice signatures that is the first to offer all desired properties for real-world implementations of quantum-secure threshold signatures: small keys and signatures, low communication and round complexity, noninteractive online signing, distributed key generation (DKG), and identifiable abort. Our starting point is the framework by Gur, Katz, and Silde (PQCrypto 2024). We change the underlying signature scheme to Raccoon (Katsumata et al, Crypto 2024), remove the trapdoor commitments, extend the scheme from two to three rounds, and then apply numerous improvements and optimizations to achieve all the above properties. We provide detailed proofs of security for our new framework and present concrete parameters and benchmarks. At the 128-bit security level, for up to 1024 parties and supporting 2 60 signatures, our scheme has 4.4 KB public keys and 11.3 KB signatures; while signing requires communication of 852 KB per party using the LaBRADOR proof system (Beullens and Seiler, Crypto 2023). An optimistic non-interactive version of our scheme requires only 76 KB communication per party. 1

问问这篇 Paper

智能体会读完全文。

Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。

可以从这些问题问起

智能体调用

Luneget_paper_fulltext

在 Lune 里问

免费开始,无需绑卡

它引用的顶会 Paper25

相关 Paper

黄昏的海面,两侧是细线勾勒的悬崖