PreCurious: How Innocent Pre-Trained Language Models Turn into Privacy Traps
Ruixuan Liu, Tianhao Wang, Yang Cao, Li Xiong
摘要
The pre-training and fine-tuning paradigm has demonstrated its effectiveness and has become the standard approach for tailoring language models to various tasks. Currently, community-based platforms offer easy access to various pre-trained models, as anyone can publish without strict validation processes. However, a released pre-trained model can be a privacy trap for fine-tuning datasets if it is carefully designed. In this work, we propose PreCurious framework to reveal the new attack surface where the attacker releases the pre-trained model and gets a black-box access to the final fine-tuned model. PreCurious aims to escalate the general privacy risk of both membership inference and data extraction on the fine-tuning dataset. The key intuition behind PreCurious is to manipulate the memorization stage of the pre-trained model and guide fine-tuning with a seemingly legitimate configuration. While empirical and theoretical evidence suggests that parameter-efficient and differentially private fine-tuning techniques can defend against privacy attacks on a fine-tuned model, PreCurious demonstrates the possibility of breaking up this invulnerability in a stealthy manner compared to fine-tuning on a benign pre-trained model. While DP provides some mitigation for membership inference attack, by further leveraging a sanitized dataset, PreCurious demonstrates potential vulnerabilities for targeted data extraction even under differentially private tuning with a strict privacy budget e.g. <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML">mml:miϵ</mml:mi> mml:mo=</mml:mo> mml:mn0.05</mml:mn></mml:math> . Thus, PreCurious raises warnings for users on the potential risks of downloading pre-trained models from unknown sources, relying solely on tutorials or common-sense defenses, and releasing sanitized datasets even after perfect scrubbing.
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引用它的顶会 Paper10
- Nearly Tight Black-Box Auditing of Differentially Private Machine LearningMeenatchi Sundaram Muthu Selva Annamalai, Emiliano De CristofaroNeurIPS 2024 · 被引用 32 次
- Forget to Flourish: Leveraging Machine-Unlearning on Pretrained Language Models for Privacy LeakageMd. Rafi Ur Rashid, Jing Liu, Toshiaki Koike-Akino, Ye Wang 等AAAI 2025 · 被引用 17 次
- Your Compiler is Backdooring Your Model: Understanding and Exploiting Compilation Inconsistency Vulnerabilities in Deep Learning CompilersSimin Chen, Jinjun Peng, Yixin He, Junfeng Yang 等S&P 2026 · 被引用 11 次
- Be Careful When Fine-tuning On Open-Source LLMs: Your Fine-tuning Data Could Be Secretly Stolen!Zhexin Zhang, Yuhao Sun, Junxiao Yang, Shiyao Cui 等ICLR 2026 · 被引用 5 次
- Beyond Indistinguishability: Measuring Extraction Risk in LLM APIsRuixuan Liu, David Evans, Li XiongS&P 2026 · 被引用 1 次
它引用的顶会 Paper26
- LoRA: Low-Rank Adaptation of Large Language ModelsEdward J. Hu, Yelong Shen, Phillip Wallis, Zeyuan Allen-Zhu 等ICLR 2022 · 被引用 18,833 次
- Membership Inference Attacks Against Machine Learning ModelsReza Shokri, Marco Stronati, Congzheng Song, Vitaly ShmatikovS&P 2017 · 被引用 5,137 次
- Extracting Training Data from Large Language ModelsNicholas Carlini, Florian Tramèr, Eric Wallace, Matthew Jagielski 等USENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 2,866 次
- Comprehensive Privacy Analysis of Deep Learning: Passive and Active White-box Inference Attacks against Centralized and Federated LearningMilad Nasr, Reza Shokri, Amir HoumansadrS&P 2019 · 被引用 1,778 次
- The Secret Sharer: Evaluating and Testing Unintended Memorization in Neural NetworksNicholas Carlini, Chang Liu, Úlfar Erlingsson, Jernej Kos 等USENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 1,386 次
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