Generating Distributional Adversarial Examples to Evade Statistical Detectors

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are known to be highly vulnerable to adversarial examples (AEs) that include malicious perturbations. Assumptions about the statistical differences between natural and adversarial inputs are commonplace in many detection techniques. As a best practice, AE detectors are evaluated against adaptive attackers who actively perturb their inputs to avoid detection. Due to the difficulties in designing adaptive attacks, however, recent work suggests that most detectors have incomplete evaluation. We aim to fill this gap by designing a generic adaptive attack against detectors: the statistical indistinguishability attack (SIA). SIA optimizes a novel objective to craft adversarial examples (AEs) that follow the same distribution as the natural inputs with respect to DNN representations. Our objective targets all DNN layers simultaneously as we show that AEs being indistinguishable at one layer might fail to be so at other layers. SIA is formulated around evading distributional detectors that inspect a set of AEs as a whole and is also effective against four individual AE detectors, two dataset shift detectors, and an out-of-distribution sample detector, curated from published works. This suggests that SIA can be a reliable tool for evaluating the security of a range of detectors.