Protecting Privacy of BLE Device Users
Kassem Fawaz, Kyu-Han Kim, Kang G. Shin
摘要
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) has emerged as an attractive technology to enable Internet of Things (IoTs) to interact with others in their vicinity. Our study of the behavior of more than 200 types of BLE-equipped devices has led to a surprising discovery: the BLE protocol, despite its privacy provisions, fails to address the most basic threat of all-hiding the device's presence from curious adversaries. Revealing the device's existence is the stepping stone toward more serious threats that include user profiling/fingerprinting, behavior tracking, inference of sensitive information, and exploitation of known vulnerabilities on the device. With thousands of manufacturers and developers around the world, it is very challenging, if not impossible, to envision the viability of any privacy or security solution that requires changes to the devices or the BLE protocol. In this paper, we propose a new device-agnostic system, called BLE-Guardian, that protects the privacy of the users/environments equipped with BLE devices/IoTs. It enables the users and administrators to control those who discover, scan and connect to their devices. We have implemented BLE-Guardian using Ubertooth One, an off-the-shelf open Bluetooth development platform, facilitating its broad deployment. Our evaluation with real devices shows that BLE-Guardian effectively protects the users' privacy while incurring little overhead on the communicating BLE-devices.
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引用它的顶会 Paper20
- SmartAuth: User-Centered Authorization for the Internet of ThingsYuan Tian, Nan Zhang, Yue-Hsun Lin, XiaoFeng Wang 等USENIX Security 2017 · 被引用 231 次
- Automatic Fingerprinting of Vulnerable BLE IoT Devices with Static UUIDs from Mobile AppsChaoshun Zuo, Haohuang Wen, Zhiqiang Lin, Yinqian ZhangCCS 2019 · 被引用 77 次
- A Billion Open Interfaces for Eve and Mallory: MitM, DoS, and Tracking Attacks on iOS and macOS Through Apple Wireless Direct LinkMilan Stute, Sashank Narain, Alex Mariotto, Alexander Heinrich 等USENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 59 次
- BadBluetooth: Breaking Android Security Mechanisms via Malicious Bluetooth PeripheralsFenghao Xu, Wenrui Diao, Zhou Li, Jiongyi Chen 等NDSS 2019 · 被引用 51 次
- FirmXRay: Detecting Bluetooth Link Layer Vulnerabilities From Bare-Metal FirmwareHaohuang Wen, Zhiqiang Lin, Yinqian ZhangCCS 2020 · 被引用 47 次
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