Chronic Poisoning: Backdoor Attack against Split Learning

Split learning is a computing resource-friendly distributed learning framework that protects client training data by splitting the model between the client and server. Previous work has proved that split learning faces a severe risk of privacy leakage, as a malicious server can recover the client's private data by hijacking the training process. In this paper, we first explore the vulnerability of split learning to server-side backdoor attacks, where our goal is to compromise the model's integrity. Since the server-side attacker cannot access the training data and client model in split learning, the traditional poisoning-based backdoor attack methods are no longer applicable. Therefore, constructing backdoor attacks in split learning poses significant challenges. Our strategy involves the attacker establishing a shadow model on the server side that can encode backdoor samples and guiding the client model to learn from this model during the training process, thereby enabling the client to acquire the same capability. Based on these insights, we propose a three-stage backdoor attack framework named SFI. Our attack framework minimizes assumptions about the attacker's background knowledge and ensures that the attack process remains imperceptible to the client. We implement SFI on various benchmark datasets, and extensive experimental results demonstrate its effectiveness and generality. For example, success rates of our attack on MNIST, Fashion, and CIFAR10 datasets all exceed 90%, with limited impact on the main task.