Blacktooth: Breaking through the Defense of Bluetooth in Silence

Bluetooth is a short-range wireless communication technology widely used by billions of personal computing, IoT, peripheral, and wearable devices. Bluetooth devices exchange commands and data, such as keyboard/mouse inputs, audio, and files, through a secure communication channel that is established through a pairing process. Due to the sensitivity of those commands and data, security mechanisms, such as encryption, authentication, and authorization, have been developed and adopted in the standards. Nevertheless, vulnerabilities continue to be discovered. In the literature, few successful attacks against the Bluetooth connection establishment stage have been reported. Many attacks simply assume that connections are already established or use a compromised agent, e.g, a malicious app or a careless user, to initialize the connection. We argue that such assumptions are strong and impractical. A stealthily established connection is a critical starting point for any practical attack against Bluetooth devices. In this paper, we demonstrate that the Bluetooth Specification contains a series of vulnerabilities that will enable an attacker to impersonate a Bluetooth device and successfully establish a connection with a victim device. The entire process does not require any involvement of the device owner/user or any malicious app on the victim device. The attacker could further escalate permissions by switching Bluetooth profiles to retrieve sensitive information from the victim device and inject arbitrary commands. We name our new attack as the Blacktooth Attack. To demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of the Blacktooth attack, we evaluate it against 21 different Bluetooth devices with diverse manufacturers and operating