The Tragedy of Convenience: Cascading User-Data Leakage from SMS-delivered URLs

Digital Services are increasingly sending private URLs over Short Message Service (SMS) to allow users to resume sessions with a single click. While convenient, this design shifts trust from explicit authentication to a potentially vulnerable communication channel. Basically, the vulnerability lies in the assumption that the private link can only be accessed by the intended user.

In this paper, we demonstrate that this assumption can be easily violated. In particular, we show how seemingly isolated link exposure can cascade into a wider data leak. Using public SMS gateways as an ethical lens, we analyze more than 322K unique private URLs extracted from over 33 million messages across 30K+ phone numbers. Across 701 URLs, we find that at least 177 web services effectively treat private URLs as bearer credentials, enabling unauthorized access to sensitive user information (e.g., financial details, national IDs) once the link is exposed.

Alarmingly, we show that 125 services are potentially enumerable, i.e., a single URL can lead to a cascading effect, resulting in the data leakage of their entire user base. Moreover, we observe that 5 services that implement authentication partially reveal account information before authentication is completed and rely on lightweight parameters (e.g., date of birth, ZIP code). Even worse, in 4 out of these 5 services, the authentication is vulnerable to bruteforce attacks. Further, we uncover that 20 services grant privileged access: 14 allow modification of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), 5 grant account access, and 1 allows both. We also find 84 services that expose additional PII beyond the landing page. Our disclosures led to acknowledgments from 18 services, 7 of which have already been fixed, positively impacting at least 120 million users.