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ICDE2021顶会

Crowdsensing Data Trading based on Combinatorial Multi-Armed Bandit and Stackelberg Game

Baoyi An, Mingjun Xiao, An Liu, Xike Xie, Xiaofang Zhou

2021年份
25被引次数
1顶会引用

摘要

Crowdsensing Data Trading (CDT), through which a platform can aggregate some data collected by a group of mobile users with sensing devices (a.k.a., data sellers) and sell the corresponding statistics to data consumers, has been recognized as a promising paradigm for large-scale data trading in recent years. It is critical to select sellers with high sensing qualities and maximize all trading participants' profits simultaneously. However, most existing CDT systems either assume that sellers' sensing qualities are known in advance or cannot realize concurrent profit maximization. In this paper, we propose a data trading mechanism based on Combinatorial Multi-Armed Bandit and three-stage Hierarchical Stackelberg game, called CMAB-HS, to tackle the problem of quality unknown seller selection and incentive strategy design. Our objective is to select a group of sellers to maximize the total sensing quality within time budget, and determine the optimal incentive strategy for each participant to maximize individual profit simultaneously. We theoretically prove that CMAB-HS achieves Stackelberg Equilibrium and a tight bound on regret. Additionally, we demonstrate its significant performances through extensive simulations on real data traces.

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