MemIncept: Steering LLM Agents via Cooperative Stealthy Memory Injections

Long-term memory empowers LLM-based agents with adaptive reasoning but exposes a critical attack surface---adversaries can inject malicious records to bias agent behaviors. However, existing attacks face a dilemma: effective injections are often visibly malicious and easily detected, while stealthy, benign-looking injections are often less effective in altering agent behaviors. To address this, we propose MemIncept, a memory poisoning attack that can impact agents even in black-box settings using only benign-appearing queries. Unlike prior methods that inject isolated records, MemIncept generates a cooperative set of queries that work together to bias the agent. It achieves this via a bidirectional evolutionary strategy that optimizes the query set from two ends. A forward pass ensures the queries collectively lead the agent to the target outcome, while a backward pass ensures they are semantically close to victim (benign) queries for reliable retrieval. This ``meet-in-the-middle'' approach creates injected records that are both easy to retrieve and effective at steering behavior. Through extensive experiments across diverse agents, we show that MemIncept significantly outperforms single-record attacks, achieving high success rates comparable to explicit attacks while remaining difficult to flag under automated filters or human inspection.