FlyTrap: Physical Distance-Pulling Attack Towards Camera-based Autonomous Target Tracking Systems
Shaoyuan Xie, Mohamad Habib Fakih, Junchi Lu, Fayzah Alshammari, Ningfei Wang, Takami Sato, Halima Bouzidi, Mohammad Abdullah Al Faruque, Qi Alfred Chen
摘要
Autonomous Target Tracking (ATT) systems, especially ATT drones, are widely used in applications such as surveillance, border control, and law enforcement, while also being misused in stalking and destructive actions. Thus, the security of ATT is highly critical for real-world applications. Under the scope, we present a new type of attack: distance-pulling attacks (DPA) and a systematic study of it, which exploits vulnerabilities in ATT systems to dangerously reduce tracking distances, leading to drone capturing, increased susceptibility to sensor attacks, or even physical collisions. To achieve these goals, we present Fly-Trap, a novel physical-world attack framework that employs an adversarial umbrella as a deployable and domain-specific attack vector. FlyTrap is specifically designed to meet key desired objectives in attacking ATT drones: physical deployability, closed-loop effectiveness, and spatial-temporal consistency. Through novel progressive distance-pulling strategy and controllable spatialtemporal consistency designs, FlyTrap manipulates ATT drones in real-world setups to achieve significant system-level impacts. Our evaluations include new datasets, metrics, and closed-loop experiments on real-world white-box and even commercial ATT drones, including DJI and HoverAir. Results demonstrate Fly-Trap's ability to reduce tracking distances within the range to be captured, sensor attacked, or even directly crashed, highlighting urgent security risks and practical implications for the safe deployment of ATT systems. Video demonstrations and code can be found at https://sites.google.com/view/av-ioat-sec/flytrap .
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper1
问问它们各自怎么用它它引用的顶会 Paper34
- MixFormer: End-to-End Tracking with Iterative Mixed AttentionYutao Cui, Cheng Jiang, Limin Wang, Gangshan WuCVPR 2022 · 被引用 746 次
- Adversarial Sensor Attack on LiDAR-based Perception in Autonomous DrivingYulong Cao, Chaowei Xiao, Benjamin Cyr, Yimeng Zhou 等CCS 2019 · 被引用 626 次
- Invisible for both Camera and LiDAR: Security of Multi-Sensor Fusion based Perception in Autonomous Driving Under Physical-World AttacksYulong Cao, Ningfei Wang, Chaowei Xiao, Dawei Yang 等S&P 2021 · 被引用 309 次
- Seeing isn't Believing: Towards More Robust Adversarial Attack Against Real World Object DetectorsYue Zhao, Hong Zhu, Ruigang Liang, Qintao Shen 等CCS 2019 · 被引用 239 次
- PatchGuard: A Provably Robust Defense against Adversarial Patches via Small Receptive Fields and MaskingChong Xiang, Arjun Nitin Bhagoji, Vikash Sehwag, Prateek MittalUSENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 172 次
相关 Paper
- Laser Shield: a Physical Defense with Polarizer against Laser Attacks on Autonomous Driving SystemsQingjie Zhang, Lijun Chi, Di Wang, Mounira Msahli 等DAC 2024 · 被引用 3 次
- Physical Hijacking Attacks against Object TrackersRaymond Muller, Yanmao Man, Z. Berkay Celik, Ming Li 等CCS 2022 · 被引用 12 次
- On the Realism of LiDAR Spoofing Attacks against Autonomous Driving Vehicle at High Speed and Long DistanceTakami Sato, Ryo Suzuki, Yuki Hayakawa, Kazuma Ikeda 等NDSS 2025
- L-HAWK: A Controllable Physical Adversarial Patch Against a Long-Distance TargetTaifeng Liu, Yang Liu, Zhuo Ma, Tong Yang 等NDSS 2025
- TRAP: Hijacking VLA CoT-Reasoning via Adversarial PatchesZhengxian Huang, Wenjun Zhu, Haoxuan Qiu, Xiaoyu Ji 等ICML 2026 · 被引用 5 次
