DirtyFree: Simplified Data-Oriented Programming in the Linux Kernel
Yoochan Lee, Hyuk Kwon, Thorsten Holz
摘要
—With the advent of Kernel Control-Flow Integrity (KCFI), Data-Oriented Programming (DOP) has emerged as an essential alternative to traditional control-flow hijacking techniques such as Return-Oriented Programming (ROP). Unlike control-flow attacks, DOP manipulates kernel data-flow to achieve privilege escalation without violating control-flow integrity. However, traditional DOP attacks remain complex and exhibit limited practicality due to their multistage nature, typically requiring heap address leakage, arbitrary address read, and arbitrary address write capabilities. Each stage imposes strict constraints on the selection and usage of kernel objects. To address these limitations, we introduce D IRTY F REE , a systematic exploitation method that leverages the arbitrary free primitive. This primitive enables the forced deallocation of attacker-controlled kernel objects, significantly reducing ex-ploitability requirements and simplifying the overall exploitation process. D IRTY F REE provides a systematic method for identifying suitable arbitrary free objects across diverse kernel caches and presents a structured exploitation strategy targeting security-critical objects such as cred . Through extensive evaluation, we successfully identified 14 arbitrary free objects covering most kernel caches, demonstrating D IRTY F REE ’s practical effectiveness by successfully exploiting 24 real-world kernel vulnerabilities. Additionally, we propose and implement two mitigation techniques designed to mitigate D IRTY F REE , effectively preventing exploitation while incurring negligible performance overhead (i.e., 0.28% and -0.55%, respectively).
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引用它的顶会 Paper2
- Discovering, characterizing and exploiting controllable-copy objects for kernel data-only attacks with CopyKatJakob Koschel, Andrea Mambretti, Alessandro Sorniotti, Pietro Moretto 等USENIX Security 2026
- Fence2Pwn: KFENCE-Enabled Kernel Exploitation Bypassing Slab Hardening and Memory TaggingErnesto Martínez García, Lukas Maar, Martin Unterguggenberger, Stefan MangardUSENIX Security 2026
它引用的顶会 Paper26
- Data-Oriented Programming: On the Expressiveness of Non-control Data AttacksHong Hu, Shweta Shinde, Sendroiu Adrian, Zheng Leong Chua 等S&P 2016 · 被引用 420 次
- Hacking in Darkness: Return-oriented Programming against Secure EnclavesJae-Hyuk Lee, Jin Soo Jang, Yeongjin Jang, Nohyun Kwak 等USENIX Security 2017 · 被引用 191 次
- HDFI: Hardware-Assisted Data-Flow IsolationChengyu Song, Hyungon Moon, Monjur Alam, Insu Yun 等S&P 2016 · 被引用 146 次
- Enforcing Kernel Security Invariants with Data Flow IntegrityChengyu Song, Byoungyoung Lee, Kangjie Lu, William Harris 等NDSS 2016 · 被引用 141 次
- FUZE: Towards Facilitating Exploit Generation for Kernel Use-After-Free VulnerabilitiesWei Wu, Yueqi Chen, Jun Xu, Xinyu Xing 等USENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 124 次
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