An Extensible Orchestration and Protection Framework for Confidential Cloud Computing
Adil Ahmad, Alex Schultz, Byoungyoung Lee, Pedro Fonseca
摘要
Confidential computing solutions are crucial to address the cloud privacy concerns. Although SGX has witnessed significant adoption in the cloud, the reliance on hardware implementation is restrictive for cloud providers in terms of orchestrating deployments and providing stronger security to their clients' enclaves. eOPF addresses this limitation by providing a comprehensive, secure hypervisor-level instrumentation framework with the ability to monitor all enclave-OS interactions and implement protected services. eOPF overcomes several challenges including bridging the semantic gap between the hypervisor and SGX and attesting the co-location of the framework with enclaves. Using eOPF, we implement two protected services that provide platform resource orchestration and complementary enclave side-channel defense. Our evaluation shows that eOPF incurs very low performance overhead (<2%) in its default state and only modest overhead (geometric mean of 17% on SPEC) when strong, complementary side-channel defenses are enabled, making eOPF an efficient and practical solution for the cloud.
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引用它的顶会 Paper8
- Veil: A Protected Services Framework for Confidential Virtual MachinesAdil Ahmad, Botong Ou, Congyu Liu, Xiaokuan Zhang 等ASPLOS 2023 · 被引用 12 次
- Pegasus: Transparent and Unified Kernel-Bypass Networking for Fast Local and Remote CommunicationDinglan Peng, Congyu Liu, Tapti Palit, Anjo Vahldiek-Oberwagner 等EuroSys 2025 · 被引用 6 次
- The HitchHiker's Guide to High-Assurance System Observability Protection with Efficient Permission SwitchesChuqi Zhang, Jun Zeng, Yiming Zhang, Adil Ahmad 等CCS 2024 · 被引用 4 次
- Kaleidoscope: Precise Invariant-Guided Pointer AnalysisTapti Palit, Pedro FonsecaASPLOS 2024 · 被引用 3 次
- AEX-NStep: Probabilistic Interrupt Counting Attacks on Intel SGXNicolas Dutly, Friederike Groschupp, Ivan Puddu, Kari Kostiainen 等S&P 2026 · 被引用 1 次
它引用的顶会 Paper25
- Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative ExecutionPaul Kocher, Jann Horn, Anders Fogh, Daniel Genkin 等S&P 2019 · 被引用 2,435 次
- Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order ExecutionJo Van Bulck, Marina Minkin, Ofir Weisse, Daniel Genkin 等USENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 1,175 次
- Sanctum: Minimal Hardware Extensions for Strong Software IsolationVictor Costan, Ilia A. Lebedev, Srinivas DevadasUSENIX Security 2016 · 被引用 649 次
- Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch ShadowingSangho Lee, Ming-Wei Shih, Prasun Gera, Taesoo Kim 等USENIX Security 2017 · 被引用 536 次
- T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave ProgramsMing-Wei Shih, Sangho Lee, Taesoo Kim, Marcus PeinadoNDSS 2017 · 被引用 431 次
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