5G-Spector: An O-RAN Compliant Layer-3 Cellular Attack Detection Service
Haohuang Wen, Phillip A. Porras, Vinod Yegneswaran, Ashish Gehani, Zhiqiang Lin
摘要
—Over the past several years, the mobile security community has discovered a wide variety of exploits against link and session-establishment protocols. These exploits can be implemented on software-defined radios (SDRs) that disrupt, spoof, or flood layer-3 (L3) messages to compromise security and privacy, which still apply to the latest 5G mobile network standard. Interestingly, unlike the prior generations of closed (proprietary) mobile network infrastructures, 5G networks are migrating toward a more intelligent and open-standards-based fully interoperable mobile architecture, called Open RAN or O-RAN . The implications of transitioning mobile infrastructures to a software-defined architectural abstraction are quite significant to the INFOSEC community, as it allows us to extend the mobile data plane and control plane with security-focused protocol auditing services and exploit detection. Based on this design, we present 5G-S PECTOR , the first comprehensive framework for detecting the wide spectrum of L3 protocol exploits on O-RAN. It features a novel security audit stream called M OBI F LOW that transfers fine-grained cellular network telemetry, and a programmable control-plane xApp called M OBIE X PERT . We present an extensible prototype of 5G-S PECTOR which can detect 7 types of cellular attacks in real-time. We also demonstrate its scalability to 11 unknown attacks as well as 31 real-world cellular traces, with effective performance (high accuracy, no false alarms) and low ( < 2% CPU, < 100 MB memory) overhead.
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引用它的顶会 Paper2
- Gotta Detect 'Em All: Fake Base Station and Multi-Step Attack Detection in Cellular NetworksKazi Samin Mubasshir, Imtiaz Karim, Elisa BertinoUSENIX Security 2025
- Magmaw: Modality-Agnostic Adversarial Attacks on Machine Learning-Based Wireless Communication SystemsJung-Woo Chang, Ke Sun, Nasimeh Heydaribeni, Seira Hidano 等NDSS 2025
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