Controlled Data Races in Enclaves: Attacks and Detection

This paper introduces controlled data race attacks, a new class of attacks against programs guarded by trusted execution environments such as Intel SGX. Controlled data race attacks are analog to controlled channel attacks, where the adversary controls the underlying operating system and manipulates the scheduling of enclave threads and handling of interrupts and exceptions. Controlled data race attacks are of particular interest for two reasons: First, traditionally non-deterministic data race bugs can be triggered deterministically and exploited for security violation in the context of SGX enclaves. Second, an intended single-threaded enclave can be concurrently invoked by the adversary, which triggers unique interleaving patterns that would not occur in traditional settings. To detect the controlled data race vulnerabilities in real-world enclave binaries (including the code linked with the SGX libraries), we present a lockset-based binary analysis detection algorithm. We have implemented our algorithm in a tool named SGXRACER, and evaluated it with four SGX SDKs and eight open-source SGX projects, identifying 1, 780 data races originated from 476 shared variables.